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Protection of Pharmaceuticals as Foreign Policy:
The Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement and Bill C-22
Versus the North American Free Trade
Agreement and Bill C-91
I. Introduction
From 1969 until 1987, Canada's compulsory licensing law for
patented pharmaceuticals produced some of the lowest consumer
drug prices in the industrialized world! "Under this system, a
manufacturer of generic drugs could produce in Canada a drug
I Within the modem pharmaceutical industry there is a distinction made between
those firms that predominately engage in research and development and those that
produce copies of off-patent drugs. See Robert S. Tancer & Shoshana B. Tancer,
MERCOUSUR and the Pharmaceutical Industry-Waiting for a Common Patent
Regime, 4 LATIN AM. L. & Bus. REP. 5 (1997).
The patent-protected firms represent the innovators; the firms that develop new
drugs and receive patent protection, allowing a period of exclusive use for 20 years
commencing with the date of filing. The generic firms are those who market copies of
the drugs once the patent has expired. Understandably, the patent-driven firms advocate
strong intellectual property protection, and argue that their ability to conduct creative
research and development (R&D) is dependent upon their ability to recoup these costs
through patent protection. The generic firms argue that they are a major factor in
lowering the cost of medicine. As these latter firms do not have R&D expenses
commensurate with the innovators, they are able to sell their products at a lower cost
than the patent-protected equivalents. Id.
2 E.g., John F. Burns, Canada Split on Drug Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1987,
at Dl (noting that Canada's use of compulsory licensing allowed "so-called generic drug
manufacturers... to copy brand-name products in Canada and sell them for as much as
50 percent less than the originals"); Peter N. Williamson, C-91 Ignited Passions, but
Loosened Purse Strings, CAN. CHEMICAL NEWS, Jan. 1, 1994, at 26 ("[Bill] C-102 [was]
introduced in 1969. C-102 gave four years of patent protection and introduced
compulsory licensing."); see also Michael Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local
Working Requirements and Compulsory Licenses at International Law, 35 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 243, 246 (1997).
"Compulsory licensing" refers to the practice of governments allowing parties other
than the original patentees to exploit patented products and processes. Id. In such cases,
the patentee is forced to grant a licence [sic] to a third-party licensee to exploit the
patented product or process, in return for which the patentee generally receives a royalty
payment at a rate set by legislative fiat. Id.
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newly patented in the United States or another country simply by
notifying the patentee and paying a fixed four percent royalty
fee."3 University of Toronto economist Harry Eastman found that
compulsory licensing saved Canadian consumers $211 million
each year.' Then, on December 7, 1987, the Progressive
Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, despite large-scale
domestic opposition,' succeeded in passing Bill C-22, which
stripped the Canadian Patent Act of much of its compulsory
licensing language.6 The new patent regime granted a ten-year
period of patent exclusivity to pharmaceutical products patented
outside of Canada, and a seventeen-year period of exclusivity to
those fully developed within Canada.7
At about the same time, U.S. politicians were openly
questioning the feasibility of various measures intended to control
rising domestic drug prices. In the United States, "[p]ricing of
pharmaceuticals is perhaps the most controversial aspect of the
industry. Consumers, and their elected legislative representatives,
are highly attuned to drug prices."9 Democrat Henry Waxman of
3 Christina Del Valle, Intellectual Property Provisions of the NAFTA, 4 No. 11 J.
PROPRIETARY RTS. 8 (1992).
4 David Crane, New Debate over Generic Drugs Looms, TORONTO STAR, June 9,
1987, at A18.
5 Id. "Ninety percent of the people we've heard are against this legislation"
(quoting Senator Lorne Bonnell, chairman of a Senate committee conducting hearings on
the proposed legislation, Bill C-22). Id.
6 See ROBERT M. CAMPBELL & LESLIE A. PAL, THE REAL WORLDS OF CANADIAN
POLITICS 46 (1994).
1 See Del Valle, supra note 3, at 9.
8 See, e.g., Robert Pear, Panel Endorses Price Controls on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 1994, at B8 (describing a proposal approved by the House Ways and Means
Subcommittee on Health establishing that "the Government would review drug prices
and could deny Medicare coverage for drugs whose prices were deemed excessive");
Judy Foreman, Report Raps High Price Increases for Prescription Drugs, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 1, 1994, at 10 (describing Senator Pryor's vow to introduce a bill imposing
tough restrictions, such as cutting back federal patent protections for companies with
excessive price increases); Robert Pear, Clinton Aides Seek New Review Board for Drug
Pricing, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1993, at Al (describing the President's Task Force on
National Health Care Reform suggestion that the Government "establish a drug price
review board to set guidelines for drug prices"); Don Colburn, Drug Prices: What's Up?,
WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1992, at Z8 (detailing Senator David Pryor's efforts to revoke
certain tax breaks if drug companies raise prices faster than the rate of inflation).
9 STUART 0. SCHWEITZER, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 8 (1997)
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California suggested the possibility of a Canadian-style
compulsory licensing system.'" "Mr. Waxman thinks that
American drugs are increasing in price too fast and talks of
encouraging a little healthy competition through a compulsory
licensing system for products on patent, as already happens in
Canada.""
In the late 1980s, a more cost-conscious federal government
that became directly involved in the delivery of health care, 2
combined with an aging population, made drug prices a hot
political issue in the United States." In fact, judging by current
rhetoric, U.S. politicians continue to believe that domestic
pharmaceutical prices are too high.'4 President Clinton recently
argued that, "no American should 'be forced to get on the bus to
("It appears that consumers are more sensitive to the prices of pharmaceuticals than they
are to other health services which are far more expensive.").
10 Pharmaceuticals, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 7, 1987.
1 Id.; see also Marlene Cimons, Waxman Blasts Cost of Prescription Drugs, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1992, at A14 (quoting Representative Waxman as stating: "Once again,
the United States is behind the rest of the world in providing health care to our people.
Canada has found ways to control prescription drug prices.... It's time for the United
States to get on the bandwagon.").
12 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW §13-1, at 561-62 (1995) ("In 1990,
government accounted for 42% of health care expenditures, and health care expenditures
constituted 15.3% of federal expenditures, 11% of state and local expenditures. By far
the largest single government health care program is the Medicare program, which
accounts for 17% of the nation's health care spending.").
13 E.g., Deborah Barfield, Drug-Maker Lobby Is Tops in Spending, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Dec. 3, 1999, at A23 (quoting Jackie Cottrell, spokeswoman for
the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, "[d]rug coverage for
seniors is going to be a highly political ...issue for the next election season");
Constance Sommer, Senate Panel Assails Drug Price Boosts; Pharmaceuticals: Leaders
Call for More Regulation, Citing a Report that Some Industry Hikes Far Outpaced
Inflation, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1993, at D2 (quoting Senator David Pryor (D-AR),
"[w]e're seeing thousands of elderly people who are saying that they must decide
whether to put food on the table, heat their home or buy prescription drugs").
14 See, e.g., Gregg Birnbaum, Hillary's Rx: Buy Canadian, N.Y. POST, Feb. 9,
2000, at 22 (quoting First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, campaigning in New York,
"[pirescription drugs are a necessity, and yet they're priced like a luxury"); Gore Pitches
Plan to Lower Drug Prices, UNION LEADER, Nov. 9, 1999, at A2 (quoting Vice President
Gore, "[r]ight now, [prescription] drug prices are way too high"); Robert Pear, Clinton Is
Going on the Offensive To Offer the Elderly a Drug Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1999, at
Al (describing President Clinton's "new attack on drug companies, saying they charge
too much").
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Canada"' to obtain prescription drugs at lower prices." However,
simply to state that no American should be forced to purchase
cheaper drugs in Canada begs the central question of this paper: to
achieve this goal does one lower the prices of drugs in the United
States, or does one raise the price of drugs in Canada? Cleary, the
result is the same: Americans are no longer going to Canada to
buy drugs. The implications of each strategy, however, could
scarcely be more opposite.
The United States seems to have followed the latter strategy.
Beginning in the early 1980s, at the same time they were seeking
to restrict domestic pharmaceutical companies' pricing policies,
U.S. politicians began to vigorously pursue the international
agenda of the domestic research pharmaceutical industry.'6 For
example, the United States insisted that intellectual property rights
be included in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. 7 In both
the bilateral Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the
multilateral North American Free Trade Agreement negotiations,
the United States Trade Representative (U.S.T.R.) demanded that
U.S. negotiating partners strengthen the protection afforded to
intellectual property as a prerequisite to obtaining an agreement.18
15 Andrew Phillips, America's Bitter Pills, MACLEAN'S, Dec. 20, 1999, at 98.
16 See, e.g., Paul C.B. Liu, Taiwan: U.S. Industry's Influence on Intellectual
Property Negotiations and Special 301 Actions, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87 (1994)
(examining the ways in which U.S. industries and industrial organizations interact with
the government, engage in the Special 301 process, and effectively influence the
outcome of international intellectual property negotiations); Charles S. Levy & Stuart M.
Weiser, The NAFTA: A Watershed for Protection of Intellectual Property, 27 INT'L LAW.
671 (1993) ("Over the last decade the United States has pursued an aggressive strategy
for improving international protection of intellectual property."); Harvey J. Winter, The
Role of the United States Government in Improving International Intellectual Property
Protection, 2 J.L. & TECH. 325 (1987) (describing the United States's agenda for
multilateral and bilateral actions to improve intellectual property protection in other
countries).
17 See THOMAS 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, RECIPROCITY AND
RETALIATION IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 192-93 (1994) (describing U.S. efforts to strengthen
GATT rules on intellectual property rights).
I8 E.g., MARCI MCDONALD, YANKEE DOODLE DANDY: BRAIN MULRONEY AND THE
AMERICAN AGENDA 213 (1995) (arguing that as the free trade negotiations with Canada
dragged on, "the White House had threatened to throw the whole thing overboard unless
Ottawa rammed through the pharmaceutical bill"); GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J.
SCHOTr, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1992) (noting
that "[t]he United States will seek to incorporate detailed obligations in the NAFTA that
lock in the recent Mexican intellectual property reforms").
[Vol. 26
2001] PROTECTION OF PHARMACEUTICALS AS FOREIGN POLICY 461
One measure of the success of the U.S. strategy is that, by the
early 1990s, proponents of compulsory licensing as a means to
control drug prices in Canada began to complain that "Canadians
may become like Americans, having to choose between putting
food on the table and prescription drugs."' 9
Why would U.S. politicians simultaneously seek to abolish
compulsory licenses abroad and implement them at home? What
explanation can there be for pursuing a foreign economic policy
that "[champions] the advances in international intellectual
property law which may increase pharmaceutical prices for people
in foreign countries," while at the same time following a domestic
economic policy that "[condemns] the pharmaceutical industry for
its high prices and high profits"?" More bluntly, as Rafael Cadena
Silva, president of ALIFAR, an umbrella organization for Latin
American pharmaceutical industries, asked why
On the one hand, [is] U.S. President Clinton trying to get
support for reform of the U.S. health system, while on the other
the U.S.A. brings pressure to bear to maintain privileges that it
holds unlawfully, and which are responsible for the collapse of
the health care system in that country"
This Comment seeks to answer this question. Part II describes
the characteristics of intellectual property that make protection
problematic.22 Specifically, because intellectual property is a
public good, it is susceptible to the free rider problem and is
under-supplied due to market failure. Part III provides a brief
review of the existing theories of international institutional
solutions to the public good problems that plague intellectual
19 Art Chamberlain, Generic Firms, Seniors Challenge Drug Law, TORONTO STAR,
Sept. 23, 1993, at D1 (quoting Brenda Drinkwalter, president of the Canadian Drug
Manufacturers Association, a generic industry trade group).
20 James M. Silbermann, The North American Free Trade Agreement's Effect on
Pharmaceutical Patents, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 607, 633 (1996) (citing
Marian Uhlman, Pushing Drug Patents, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 7, 1993, at DI).
21 North and South Americans against Patents, MARKETLETTER, May 30, 1994; see
also Silbermann, supra note 20, at 633 (citing Uhlman, supra note 20, at DI) (quoting
Agnes Varis, President of Agvar Chemicals, arguing "that while the United States is
trying to reduce drug prices domestically, the international patent laws that the
pharmaceutical industry and the U.S. government are seeking will raise pharmaceutical
prices for people in foreign countries").
22 See infra notes 31-64 and accompanying text.
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property. 3 In particular, Part III emphasizes the redistributive
nature of international institutions and explains how, in certain
circumstances, domestic political actors can alter the choices
available to domestic and foreign politicians.24 Part III also
provides a theory that describing international institutions as
international solutions to domestic political problems.25 Part IV
details the research pharmaceutical industry in the United States in
two distinct phases.26 In the first instance, attention is paid to how
this industry lost an important, and in many ways symbolic,
domestic political battle.27 In the second instance, attention is paid
to how this industry shifted the public policy debate away from
domestic prices and toward international piracy. 8 Part V focuses
on the Canadian response to this shift in U.S. foreign economic
policy. 29 This section describes how U.S. pressure, emanating from
the U.S.-based research pharmaceutical industry, compelled
Canada to abandon its system of compulsory licensing for a patent
system that more closely mirrors that of the United States. Part VI
offers conclusions and possible areas of further study.3"
II. The Practical Problem of International Intellectual
Property Rights
A. Public Goods and Free Riders
"Because of its intangible nature, intellectual property differs
from the more familiar tangible property . . . .The intangible
nature of intellectual property leads to special difficulties of
protection. Once information is created . . . .it is difficult to
prevent others from using it."3' Intellectual property is a public
23 See infra notes 65-148 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 85-124 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 125-48 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 149-265 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 149-201 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 202-65 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 266-397 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 398-401 and accompanying text.
31 Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad:
Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 279 (1991); see also ALFONSO
GAMBARDELLA, SCIENCE AND INNOVATION: THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
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good. Economist Paul Samuelson identified two distinguishing
features of public goods." Unlike private goods, a public good is
non-rival in consumption and is non-excludable. Non-rivalry in
consumption means that "one person's consumption of the good
does not reduce its availability to anyone else."3 Theoretically, a
pure public good is infinitely available; i.e., it is not scarce. Non-
excludability indicates that the producer of the public good is
unable to preclude those who did not pay for the good from
consuming it.36 "In other words, those who do not purchase or pay
for any of the public.., good cannot be excluded or kept from
sharing in the consumption of the good, as they can where
noncollective goods are concerned.
37
A central characteristic, then, of public goods is their
susceptibility to the free rider problem, "wherein cheaters benefit
from the collective good but refuse to pay their 'fair' share toward
providing it."'38 Because the enjoyment of public goods cannot
easily be excluded from those who did not contribute to their
production, individuals have an incentive to "free ride" on the
efforts of others. 39 Therefore, public goods suffer from the
DURING THE 1980s 5 (1995) ("[llnformation is a peculiar commodity in that it can be re-
produced at zero cost. Any buyer of the information, or anyone who happens to have it,
can become a producer of it.").
32 Paul A. David, Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda's Thumb:
Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and History, in GLOBAL
DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 24
(Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS] ("Modem economic analysis recognizes that the
peculiar, 'public good' nature of information as a commodity creates serious resource
allocation problems for competitive market systems.").
33 Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 387 (1954).
34 THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 352 (David W. Pearce ed., 1992).
35 Id.; see also David, supra note 32, at 26 ("[K]nowledge differs from ordinary
'private' commodities in being what economists refer to as a nonrival good; that is, it can
be possessed and enjoyed jointly by as many as care to make use of it.").
36 THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, supra note 34, at 352; see also
David, supra note 32, at 25 (noting that information is indivisible and durable).
37 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 14-15 (1965).
38 ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 74
(1987).
39 Id.
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collective action problem."° Internationally, "[f]ree riding in
relation to intellectual property is simply shorthand for what
happens when technical knowledge is treated as property in one
country but not in another."4'
B. Public Goods and Market Failures
Markets will fail to produce at socially optimal levels those
products or services where "exclusion costs are high....
consumption tends to be nonrival, and .. . the prospects for
payment and profit are low" or if "some gains or costs to society
are not reflected in market prices." 2 Of the reasons economist
Francis Bator offers for market failure, two are most relevant to
public goods. 3 First, public goods may be undersupplied due to a
40 DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 5
(1991).
A collective action problem arises when individuals, acting out of pure self-
interest, are unable to coordinate their efforts to produce and consume certain
public goods they find desirable. Each individual, figuring that he can enjoy
with impunity the fruits of the public good without contributing [to its
production], tries to get a free ride on the efforts of others. Unfortunately, since
everyone thinks alike, no public good is produced, and everyone is worse off
than he would have been had each contributed his fair share and the public good
been provided.
Id.
41 Robert M. Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense
for the World, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note
32, at 75.
42 JOE B. STEVENS, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLECTIVE CHOICE 62 (1993); see also
Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 351 (1958) (a market
failure is "the failure of a more or less idealized system of price-market institutions to
sustain 'desirable' activities or to stop 'undesirable' activities"); Robert Keohane, The
Demand for International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 141 (Stephen Krasner
ed., 1983).
In situations of market failure, economic activities uncoordinated by
hierarchical authority lead to inefficient results, rather than to the efficient
outcomes expected under conditions of perfect competition. In the theory of
market failure, the problems are attributed not to inadequacies of the actors
themselves ... but rather to the structure of the system and the institutions, or
lack thereof, that characterize it. Specific attributes of the system impose
transaction costs (including information costs) that create barriers to effective
cooperation among the actors.
Id. at 51.
43 See Bator, supra note 42, at 354-71; THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN
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market failure by enforcement." Bator calls this an ownership
externality. 5  An ownership externality exists because of
nonappropriability."6 When effective ownership of public goods,
such as intellectual property, is compromised by lack of adequate
enforcement, individuals have little incentive to undertake
research and development, the income from which they cannot
enjoy.4 7
The total revenue created from information is inappropriable
because its consumption cannot be excluded from those who did
not pay for it." The degree of appropriability depends, in large
measure, on the nature of the product itself. "For certain
technology, the ability to free ride is remarkably easy. Software
and medicine are ... classic examples ... of technology that is
costly and risky to develop, yet quite easy to copy." 9
Second, according to Bator, public goods may be
undersupplied due to a market failure by existence."° This case is
ECONOMICS, supra note 36, at 267 (noting that markets may fail because of the
characteristics of the goods or service. Specifically, public goods, characterized by non-
excludability and non-rivalry in consumption, will not be optimally supplied by the
market because no individual can exclude those who did not pay from consuming it.).
44 Bator, supra note 42, at 354.
45 Id. at 364; see also LANCE E. DAVIS & DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 16 (1971) ("Externalities in production
exist whenever the firm making the production decision does not bear all the costs
inherent in the decision or whenever it is unable to accrue all the revenues from selling
the output that results from that decision.") (emphasis added).
46 Bator, supra note 42, at 365.
47 Id. at 370.
[With public goods], a pricing game will not induce consumers truthfully to
reveal their preferences. It pays each consumer to understate his desire for X
relative to Y, since his enjoyment of X is a function only of total X, rather than,
as is true of a pure private good, just of that fraction of X he pays for.
Id.
48 David J. Teece, Capturing Value from Technological Innovation: Integration,
Strategic Partnering, and Licensing Decisions, in TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL INDUSTRY:
COMPANIES AND NATIONS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 65 (Bruce R. Guile & Harvey Brooks
eds., 1987). "A regime of appropriability refers to the environmental factors, excluding
firm and market structure, that govern an innovator's ability to capture the profits
generated by an innovation. The most important dimensions of such a regime are the
nature of the technology and the efficacy of legal mechanisms of protection." Id. at 67.
49 Sherwood, supra note 41, at 76.
50 See Bator, supra note 42, at 371.
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best exemplified by the above-referenced free rider problem.
Because public goods cannot easily be excluded from those who
did not contribute to their provision, the prices that producers wish
to charge and that consumers are willing to pay are never
equated." Therefore, producers have no price incentive to provide
public goods."
In countries that offer effective intellectual property protection,
such as the United States, research pharmaceutical companies
spend millions of dollars on research and development, confident
in their ability to appropriate the value of that research in the form
of patent rights. 3 Those countries that do not offer effective
protection receive very little in the way of research and
development investment." Because intellectual property is non-
excludable, however, these countries can receive the benefits of
research done in the United States."
In those countries that do not protect intellectual property,
manufacturers can produce pharmaceuticals that are patented in
51 Id. at 370-71.
52 STEVENS, supra note 42, at 62 (arguing that "market output will be inefficiently
small if exclusion costs are high, if consumption tends to be nonrival, and if the
prospects for payment and profit are low").
53 Gerald Mossinghoff & Thomas Bombelles, The Importance of Intellectual
Property Protection to the American Research-Intensive Pharmaceutical Industry, 31
COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 38 (1996).
54 Id. (citing a study by Dr. Edwin Mansfield of the International Finance
Corporation, an arm of the World Bank, noting the uniqueness of intellectual property by
arguing that "[wlhile most companies may undertake basic investments abroad, such as
establishing sales and distribution outlets or new factories, intellectual property
protection in foreign countries is considered a must if R&D investment or any
subsequent investment in distribution and factories is to occur").
55 Ed Hore, Abolition of Compulsory Licensing Means Foreigners Won't Subsidize
Our Health Care System Anymore, THE LAWYERS WEEKLY, Nov. 26, 1993.
The magic of Canada's compulsory licensing scheme was that, in actual fact,
medical research was of course going to go on around the world, regardless of
what we did here with our patent system. The big drug companies were not
going to stop investing in R&D, just because some bureaucrats in Ottawa were
in effect taking away their patent protection in Canada, and our patent
mandarins knew it. Canada was just too small a market to really matter. So we
Canucks got to have our cake and eat it, too: we could, in effect, abolish patent
protection for drugs, confident that progress on new drugs would still go
forward, paid for by consumers outside Canada.
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other countries without the additional costs of research and
development. 6 Therefore, these manufacturers can sell these
"pirated" products for less money. 7 Alan Sager, a health-policy
expert at Boston University, calls this "an odd system of 'foreign
aid' from U.S. consumers to people in other rich countries.""
Representative Henry Waxman argues further that "[i]t appears
that our citizens are bearing a disproportionate portion of the
burden of drug research, while other countries get both the
benefits of the research and significantly lower prices."59
This is true of Canada's use of compulsory licensing of
pharmaceuticals. "We Canadians ... used our patent system as a
way to get foreigners to subsidize our deluxe health care system.""
The scheme was simple: international drug companies were
forced by the Canadian government to give licenses to Canadian
companies at below-market rates to manufacture or import generic
equivalents of patented drugs. Because the Canadian companies
did not have to pay for the research that went into inventing the
new drug, they were naturally able to sell their equivalents
cheaper, allowing the Canadian consumer to buy drugs at bargain
prices.61
The above description of intellectual property rights suggests
that any approach to solve the appropriability problem must be
global in nature, so as to avoid the free rider problem.62 A solution
that would allow the holders of intellectual property, such as
56 Bruce A. Lehman, Intellectual Property Under the Clinton Administration, 27
GEO. WASH. J. Ir, r'L L. & ECON. 395, 395 (1993) ("Other nations often look for a free
ride, seeking to build their economies not by encouraging the innovation and creativity
of their own people through strong protection for all forms of intellectual property, but
by promoting intellectual property piracy through weak laws or no protection at all.").
57 Id.
58 Phillips, supra note 15, at 98.
59 Cimons, supra note 11, at A14.
60 Hore, supra note 55.
61 Id.
62 See Leaffer, supra note 31, at 275 ("Today's research and development costs
require large-scale production, open international markets, and protection against free-
riding imitators to recoup costs of production."); see also Peter Drahos, Global Law
Reform and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Intellectual Property, 7 AUSTL. J. CoRp. L. 45,
49 (1996) ("The U.S. faced a massive free rider problem. The way in which it chose to
solve that problem was through forging a link between the international trade regime and
the development and enforcement of intellectual property standards.").
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research pharmaceutical firms, to appropriate fully the value of
their property would require participation by those who would
wish to utilize that property for free. In the United States, the
solution to the public good problem of intellectual property has
been to grant the inventor a period of market exclusivity known as
a patent." Therefore, from the perspective of the U.S. research
pharmaceutical industry, the key to an international solution to the
appropriability problem associated with intellectual property is the
creation of an international institution that establishes a minimum
standard for patent protection.64
III. Theories of International Institutions and Domestic
Politics
Two of the most popular schools of international relations
thought employed by political scientists to explain international
cooperation are neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism.65
63 See N.V. Philips' Gloeilampenfabrieken v. Atomic Energy Comm'n., 316 F.2d
401 (1963) ("If there were no patent system at all, anyone would be free to use any
invention. A patent, however, gives one person the right to exclude all others. This
monopoly is the property right in the patent."). But see Richard Rapp & Richard Rozek,
Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries, 24 J.
WORLD TRADE 75, 91 (1990):
[I]t is important to clarify the meaning of the fundamental characteristic of all
patents; namely, exclusivity for a limited time for a product or process narrowly
defined by the claims of the patent. This narrowly defined right to exclusivity
must not be confused with monopoly power. Economists define monopoly as a
situation where one firm is the only supplier of a product or service for which
there are no close substitutes. A producer of a patented pharmaceutical product
often faces competition from products that are found in the same chemical or
therapeutic class.
Id.
64 See Silbermann, supra note 20, at 608 (quoting Arthur Wineburg, NAFTA to
Break Down Barriers, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 26, 1992, at 21) (noting that "[a]lthough
intellectual property has become a global commodity," the rights in this commodity are
"limited by national borders").
65 Emerson Niou & Peter Ordeshook, "Less Filling, Tastes Great," 46 WORLD
POLITICS 209 (1994) ("The debate between realists and neoliberals focuses on two
issues: (1) delineating the goals that best account for the actions of states, especially
patterns of cooperation and conflict; and (2) assessing whether institutions of different
types ameliorate conflict in an otherwise anarchic environment."); see also
INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (Robert J. Beck et al. eds., 1996); Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International
Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335
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Sharing a common theoretical foundation, these two theories offer
diametric conclusions about the likelihood, importance, and
endurance of international cooperation. For neorealists,
international cooperation is either ephemeral or epiphenomenal.66
In the former, cooperation that does occur is the result of the
presence of a common threat-usually military-that, once
receded, yields the dissolution of cooperation.67 In the latter,
cooperation is merely an extension of power politics and mirrors
the power distribution already evident in the international system.68
For neorealists, states' relative gains concerns imply that
cooperation fails to enduringly change the states' relationships or
behaviors.69
In contrast, neoliberal institutionalism has focused on the
ability of international institutions to constrain state behavior in an
anarchic international environment by changing state preferences,
thereby increasing the shadow of the future, ° and providing
effective monitoring and enforcement.7' For the neoliberal, states
(1989); NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Robert 0. Keohane ed., 1986).
66 See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
67 See Stephen M. Walt, Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power, in
THE PERILS OF ANARCHY: CONTEMPORARY REALISM AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 208
(Michael E. Brown et al. eds., 1995) (arguing that alliances are formed in response to
military threats).
68 Robert G. Gilpin, The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism, in
NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 65, at 301 (arguing that "the final arbiter of
things political is power").
69 Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of
the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT'L ORG. 485,487 (1988) ("For realists, a state
will focus both on its absolute and relative gains from cooperation, and a state that is
satisfied with a partner's compliance in ajoint arrangement might nevertheless exit from
it because the partner is achieving relatively greater gains."); see also JOSEPH M. GRIECO,
COOPERATION AMONG NATIONS: EUROPE, AMERICA, AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO
TRADE 39 ("[R]ealists find that the fundamental goal of states in any relationship is not
to attain the highest possible individual gain or payoff, instead it is to prevent others
from achieving advances in their relative capabilities.").
70 Geoffrey Garrett & Barry Weingast, Ideas, Interests and Institutions:
Constructing the European Community's Internal Market, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN
POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 173 (Judith Goldstein & Robert
0. Keohane eds., 1993) ("Without a doubt, repeated interaction and the 'long arm of the
future' play large roles in enabling actors to capture the gains from cooperation.").
71 WALTER MATII, THE LOGIC OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION: EUROPE AND BEYOND
13-14 (1998) (In order to improve compliance with the rules of cooperation, countries
must establish "'commitment institutions' such as centralized monitoring and third party
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 26
are more concerned-particularly in economic issues such as
intellectual property-with achieving absolute gains from
cooperation. Cooperation serves the functional purpose of
overcoming market failures and reducing transaction costs.72 By
cooperating, states can overcome collective action problems,73
internalize externalities,74 solve disequilibrium problems," and
provide for efficiencies of scale and scope.76
Political scientist Robert Keohane provides a useful starting
point for analyzing neoliberalism's ability to explain international
cooperation.77 First, according to Keohane, the demand for
enforcement"); see also Robert Axelrod & Robert Keohane, Achieving Cooperation
under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 237
(Kenneth Oye ed., 1986) (noting that institutions "provide information about actors'
compliance, . . . and they may even apportion responsibility for decentralized
enforcement of rules").
72 James Morrow, Social Choice and System Structure in World Politics, 41
WORLD POLrICS 75, 80 (1988) (institutions "reduce transaction costs and uncertainty
among actors and facilitate coordination of action among them").
73 Kenneth Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypothesis and
Strategies, 38 WORLD POLITICS 1 (1985); Robert Axelrod & Robert Keohane, Achieving
Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, 38 WORLD POLITICS 226
(1986).
74 LANCE E. DAVIS & DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 12 (1971) (arguing that institutions change when
"arrangemental innovation can successfully internalize [external profits]").
75 Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and
Legislative Choice, 37 PUBLIC CHOICE 503 (1981) (arguing that institutions such as
committee rules and structure constrain the possible alternatives available to legislators
and, thereby, reduce cycling under majority rule voting by reducing log-rolling, vote
trading, coalition formation, and bargaining); William H. Riker, Implications from the
Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 432
(1980) (arguing that stability in the political system is a function of institutional
constraints).
76 YEONG HEOK LEE, VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: A
TRANSACTION COST APPROACH (1994) (arguing that vertical integration, not firm size,
accounts for economies of scale in "informational economies" in firms); OLIVER
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATION
(1975) (arguing that firm structure is driven by transaction costs and the desire to
overcome them through vertical integration).
77 E.g., Keohane, supra note 42; ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY:
COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1985); Robert
Keohane & Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence Revisited, 41 INT'L ORG. 725
(1987).
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international institutions is produced by market failures.78 Second,
Keohane argues that cooperation must be Pareto-improving." The
Pareto criterion defines a social welfare function. Specifically,
"[s]ociety's scarce resources are optimally allocated when no one
could be better off without making someone worse off."8 A Pareto
improvement, also known as Pareto superiority, is any reallocation
of resources that benefits at least one person without making
anyone else worse off.8'
Neoliberals assume that states voluntarily choose whether or
not to enter into cooperative agreements with other states.82 In
other words, the neoliberal assumes "that states enter the market of
international relations in order to obtain gains from exchange. One
corollary of this assumption is that, where states find no gains
from trade, there should be no trade: no cooperation and no
integration."83 This focus on voluntarism and Pareto optimality
provides neoliberals with a convenient test for the Pareto
efficiency of international institutions: "whether each state accepts
its operating rules."8
78 Keohane, supra note 42, at 151.
79 See Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 71, at 226.
80 NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 30 (1994).
81 Id.; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14 (1998)
(noting that when transactions are purely voluntary, "the criterion of Pareto superiority is
unanimity of all affected persons").
82 Keohane, supra note 42, at 146 ("The use of rational-choice theory implies that
we must view decisions involving international regimes as in some meaningful sense
voluntary.").
83 Joel P. Trachtman, Institutions for International Economic Integration: The
Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the International Economic Organization: Toward
Comparative Institutional Analysis, 17 J. INT'L L. & BUS. 470, 489 (1996).
84 Id. at 516. In organizational terms, "an organization is considered to be efficient
if the members unanimously accept the general rules under which it operates. Thus, the
test for Pareto efficiency of an [international economic organization] is whether each
state accepts its operating rules." Bruno S. Frey & Beat Gygi, International
Organizations from the Constitutional Point of View, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 58, 60 (Roland Vaubel & Thomas D. Willett eds.,
1991) (citing GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES:
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (1986)).
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A. Redistributive International Institutions
Several scholars have taken issue with the neoliberal
interpretation of institutional cooperation.85 Paul A. Samuelson has
described how
the rational self-interest of each of two free wills does not
necessitate that there will emerge, even in the most idealized
game-theoretic situation, a Pareto-optimal solution that
maximizes the sum of two opponent's profits, in advance of and
without regard to how that maximized profit is to be divided up
among them. Except by fiat of the economic analyst or by his
tautologically redefining what constitutes non-rational behavior
we cannot rule out a non-Pareto-optimal.86
Rephrasing Samuelson, "domestic politics can lead national
governments to create international institutions that are politically
efficient but do not lie on the Pareto frontier."87 From this
perspective, international institutions are seen as mechanisms for
the redistribution of wealth or resources.8 Cooperation does not
necessarily lead to greater goods for all, but may, in fact,
85 See, e.g., John Richards, Towards a Positive Theory of International Relations
(1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("International institutions
necessarily alter the marketplace from what would have occurred absent regulation, and
are thus inherently redistributive institutions which benefit some actors at the expense of
others."); Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 30 L. &
Soc'Y REv. 87, 90 (1996), cited in Christopher P. Manfredi & Scott Lemieux, Judicial
Discretion and Fundamental Justice: Sexual Assault in the Supreme Court of Canada,
47 AM. J. COMP. L. 489, 514 (arguing that institutional development is "a contest among
actors to establish rules which structure political competition to those outcomes most
favorable to them"); James K. Sebenius, Challenging Conventional Explanations of
International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic
Communities, 46 INT'L ORG. 323, 327 (1992) ("Sub-optimal 'cooperation' in the
presence of distributional conflict-cooperation below the Pareto frontier-is quite a
general phenomenon.").
86 PAUL A. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1947), quoted in
R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 161 (1988).
87 John E. Richards, Toward a Positive Theory of International Institutions:
Regulating International Aviation Markets, 53 INT'L ORG. 1, 9 (1999).
88 See Thomas Oatley & Robert Nabors, Redistributive Cooperation: Market
Failure, Wealth Transfers, and the Basle Accord, 52 INT'L ORG. 35, 37 (1998) (arguing
that "politicians propose international institutions to resolve domestic political dilemmas
and that the international institutions they propose sometimes will be intentionally
redistributive").
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reapportion existing goods from the many to the few.89
Still, political scientist John Richards notes that "arguing that
national politicians can create international institutions that
transfer wealth from domestic interests in other states to their own
domestic constituents seems to contradict the literature on
international cooperation-which implies that all international
agreements are voluntary."9 However, Richards supplies two
reasons why politicians might voluntarily accept Pareto-inferior
agreements:
First, wealth-transferring international regulations can benefit
national politicians if the domestic actors who actually transfer
wealth abroad are not part of the politicians' coalition or if
coalition members stand to gain from an international
agreement .... The second reason national politicians might
voluntarily accept wealth-reducing international regulations
stems from the potential for states with market power to
unilaterally define the reversion point of international
negotiations.91
1. Redistributive International Institutions-The
Importance of the Reversion Point
As political scientists Thomas Oatley and Robert Nabors
correctly point out,
"[c]ooperative" international redistribution is possible.., only if
two stringent conditions are met: unanimity is the choice rule
and no actor has the ability to manipulate the choice set, that is,
the set of alternatives from which the outcome is selected. If
either of these conditions is missing, politicians can construct an
international institution that transfers wealth.
9 2
Therefore, regardless of the voting rule, an actor with the ability to
manipulate the choice set can obtain a redistributive outcome. This
is true because politicians "might voluntarily accept wealth-
reducing international regulations . . . [when] states with market
power . . . unilaterally define the reversion point of international
89 Richards, supra note 87, at 1.
90 Id. at 12.
9' Id. at 12-13.
92 Oatley & Nabors, supra note 88, at 41.
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negotiations."93 "States with market power are... able to dictate
the reversion point of no international agreement and are thereby
able to define the choice set available to other national
politicians."9
Unlike neoliberals who have focused on international
agreements that are Pareto improvements over the status quo, this
comment asks the question: What happens if the status quo is
removed from the choice set?" Economist Francis Edgeworth
argued that two individuals engaged in exchanging goods would
end up on the Pareto frontier because, if they did not, there would
remain positions to which they could move by exchange that
would make them both better off. 6 Samuelson disagreed with
Edgeworth's prediction about the necessity of Pareto solutions to
voluntary negotiations because "one or both [may be] unwilling to
discuss the possibility of making a mutually favorable movement
for fear that the discussion may imperil the existing tolerable
status quo."" Samuelson's conclusion illustrates the importance of
the status quo and the reversion point in determining both the
nature of the negotiating process (including whether negotiating
will occur at all) and the predictability of the resultant agreements
(i.e., whether those agreements will fall along the Pareto frontier
or at some Pareto-inferior solution).
An agenda-setter who can eliminate the status quo as the
reversion point may be able to impose Pareto inferior outcomes. If
the status quo is not the outcome associated with no-agreement,
93 Richards, supra note 87, at 12-13 (defining the reversion point as the outcome
obtained in the absence of a new agreement); see, e.g., William F. Shugart, II & Robert
D. Tollison, Inter-Institutional Analysis: Interest Groups and the Courts, 6 GEo. MASON
L. REV. 953, 956 (1998) (defining the reversion point as a fallback position); Linda A.
Schwartzstein, Bureaucracy Unbounded: The Lack of Effective Constraints in the
Judicial Process, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 597, 611 (1991) (defining the reversion point as
"what will happen if the voters defeat the proposal").
91 Richards, supra note 87, at 13.
95 This paper employs the terms "reversion point" and "status quo" to differentiate
between two possible no-agreement outcomes: (1) status quo-the return to
circumstances as they existed prior to entering into negotiations; and (2) reversion
point-a non-status quo, no-agreement alternative dictated by the participant with
market power.
96 FRANCIS EDGEWORTH, MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS (1881), noted in COASE, supra
note 86, at 160.
97 COASE, supra note 86, at 160.
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then the alternatives offered for consideration are compared not to
the status quo but to each other.
The ability to control the agenda gives the setter a monopoly
power which he can exploit to an extent that depends on the status
quo. By facing the voters with a 'take-it-or-leave-it' choice, the
setter exercises a threat over the voters. The worse the status quo,
the greater the threat and, consequently, the greater the gain to the
setter from being able to propose the alternative.98
When an actor can set a reversion point that is not the status
quo, the Pareto criterion is rendered void. An actor who can
manipulate the choice set to include only Pareto inferior
possibilities-including the reversion point-will be able to obtain
a redistributive international institutional agreement even under
unanimity. In fact, the farther the reversion point is from the status
quo, the greater the concessions that the actor setting the reversion
point can successfully demand.99  As Oatley and Nabors
summarize, "[w]ith the status quo no longer a relevant choice,
foreign politicians must choose among costly outcomes and will
choose the least costly-the powerful actor's desired regulation-
even though it entails a negative wealth transfer.""'
Arvind Subramanian calls this "status quo reciprocity because
the status quo is offered as the concession in return for changes
demanded of others. In other words, the denial of existing market
access concessions was the threat for refusal to increase
[intellectual property] protection."'01 According to Subramanian,
"Section 301 of the US trade law has pre-empted and indeed
defined the outcome in TRIPs to a considerable extent. '[S]tatus
quo' reciprocity appears to have played an important role, so that
the abstention from withdrawal of existing market access appears
98 Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled
Agendas, and the Status Quo, 33 PUB. CHOICE 27, 35-36 (1978).
99 Id.
The ability to control the agenda gives the setter a monopoly power which he can
exploit to an extent that depends on the [reversion point]. By facing the voters with a
'take-it-or-leave-it' choice, the setter exercises a threat over the voters. The worse the
[reversion point], the greater the threat and, consequently, the greater the gain to the
setter from being able to propose the alternative. Id.
100 Oatley & Nabors, supra note 88, at 41.
101 Arvind Subramanian, TRIPs and the Paradigm of the GAIT: A Tropical,
Temperate View, 13 WORLD ECON. 509, 510 (1990).
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to have been presented as 'compensation.' ' ' 112 This means that
traditional notions of issue-linkage bargaining in the context of the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade negotiations and the use by the United
States of unilateral trade actions aimed at countries that failed to
adequately protect U.S. intellectual property interests may not
provide comprehensive explanations of the resultant agreements.1 3
"In other words, multilateral outcomes need not always be
determined by multilateral bargaining, which is thought to protect
the small against the strong, but might serve to legitimize the
objectives of bilateralism."'
All political systems have rules governing how, when, and by
whom alternatives may be considered. From Athenian democracy
to bicameral legislatures, societies find it necessary to somehow
restrict the political options available for consideration. As
political scientist William Riker argues:
In any organized decision-making body, committee, legislature,
or whole government, one function of leaders is to guide the
operation of the body .... Despite institutional variations, the
leaders in every such body must select the alternatives among
which decisions will be made, and they must select the
procedures for coming to a choice.' 5
These restricted groups of "alternatives among which
decisions will be made" are the agenda.' 6 Those in positions of
control over what gets on the agenda are agenda-setters. '"
"A dynamic method of controlling the agenda is the
introduction of new dimensions and issues in order to generate
102 Id. at 520.
103 Michael P. Ryan, Function-Specific and Linkage-Bargain Diplomacy of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 535, 542
(1998) ("U.S. trade diplomats hypothesized that a linkage-bargain conducted within the
GATT forum could achieve an unprecedented multilateral intellectual property
agreement. The 'South' would get apparel and agricultural liberalization; the 'North'
would get globally universal, minimum-standard intellectual property protections .....
104 Subramanian, supra note 101, at 520.
105 WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION
BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 169 (1982).
106 Id.
107 Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled
Agendas, and the Status Quo, 33 PUB. CHOICE 27, 27 (1978).
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disequilibrium."'' 8 This dynamic form of agenda setting is known
as heresthetics.'o Heresthetics involve "changing the space or the
constraints on the voters in such a way that they are encouraged
.. to move themselves to the advantage of the heresthetician."" °
In contrast to rhetoric where the rhetorician attempts to change the
preferences of voters through persuasion and argument,
heresthetics alters the relevant voting space so that, by necessity, a
new majority forms that is consistent with--or at least more
consistent with-the preferences of the heresthetician.
Heresthetics creates this new winning majority without changing
the underlying preferences of voters. Instead, this new majority is
obtained by altering the relevant voting space by adding new
dimensions, strategic voting, or agenda-setting. In Riker's words,
"[m]anipulating the social agenda with a new issue that generates
disequilibrium allows old losers to become new winners."'
2. Redistributive International Institutions-The
Importance of How Gains Are Distributed
Along with manipulation of the choice set, the other reason
why politicians might accept a Pareto-inferior international
institution is how the benefits from that institution will be
distributed domestically. "Wealth-transferring international
regulations can benefit national politicians if the domestic actors
who actually transfer wealth abroad are not part of the politician's
coalition or if coalition members stand to gain from an
international agreement.""' 2 Richards' analysis points out that the
focus on the distributional aspects of international regulations and
the institutions that embody them must not only include how
wealth is divided among nations, but also how that wealth is
divided within nations."3
Since most international institutions have some distributional
,08 RIKER, supra note 105, at 237.
,09 William H. Riker, Heresthetic and Rhetoric in the Spatial Model, in ADVANCES
IN THE SPATIAL THEORY OF VOTING 46, 47 (James M. Enelow & Melvin J. Hinich eds.,
1990).
110 Id.
IlI RIKER, supra note 105, at 215.
112 Richards, supra note 87, at 12.
"13 Id. at 13-14.
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aspect, the choice among available institutions may revolve
around (1) which institutional arrangement provides the greatest
amount of wealth to an individual politician's constituents, or (2)
which institutional arrangement most constrains the constituents of
the politician's opponents. In either case, the national politicians'
focus is not only on the distribution of benefits between his
country as a whole and those other countries which are parties to
the agreement, but also on the distribution of benefits within his
country. National politicians will support those proposed
institutions that offer the greatest gains, not for the country as a
whole, but for his or her elective constituency."4 According to this
view, the "development of... institutions is not best explained as
a Pareto-superior response to collective goals or benefits but,
rather, as a by-product of conflicts over distributional gains.""5
The domestic distributional consequences of international
institutions can be characterized within the framework of
regulation theory."16 Theories of regulation attempt to answer
questions such as the following: why do governments regulate
some industries and not others and, given the possible universe of
4 Oatley & Nabors, supra note 88, at 38.
[Politicians face] a trade-off between efforts to maximize one's number of votes
and efforts to maximize one's campaign contributions. Regulation extended to
producers in exchange for campaign contributions imposes costs (deadweight
losses) on society, causing those who bear the costs of these regulations to vote
for another candidate. Removing regulation that provides rents to producers will
increase votes but will cause producers to contribute to candidates that promise
to reimpose the regulation. Given this trade-off, politicians maximize utility by
equating the marginal campaign contribution from regulation with the marginal
loss in votes caused by the resulting transfers. The result is a market in which
producer and consumer groups compete for wealth transfers.
Id.
"15 JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 19 (1992).
Put simply, if self-interested actors want institutional arrangements that favor
them as individuals, they will prefer institutional rules that constrain the actions
of others with whom they interact. That is, they will want to structure the
choices of others in such a way as to produce social outcomes that give them the
distributional advantage.
Id. at64.
116 A. STONE, REGULATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 10(1982) (defining regulation as
"a state-imposed limitation on the discretion that may be exercised by individuals or
organizations, which is supported by the threat of sanction").
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regulations, why does regulation take the form that it does?'
1 7
According to positive theories of regulation, "[r]egulation is one
avenue by which an interest group can increase its income by
having the state redistribute wealth from other parts of society to
that interest group.""' 8
As the economic theory of regulation predicts,
it is likely that no single group can ever completely capture the
regulator but that several groups will temporarily and
alternatively hold him hostage. Indeed, at times the regulator
appears to be attempting to dance not to a single fiddle but to an
entire orchestra, the individual members of which are all playing
different tunes.119
There may, however, be circumstances when one group finds
itself part of a series of losing minorities. That is to say, some
organized interests may be unable to reorganize the political space
in such a way as to become part of a winning majority. In such a
case, Riker argues, "[o]ne can expect that losers on a series of
decisions under a particular set of rules will attempt (often
successfully) to change institutions and hence the kind of
decisions produced under them.""'2 In other words, finding
themselves losers in the domestic political process, an organized
interest may choose to switch to the international level.' By
moving their political demands out of the domestic political
process and into an international setting, organized interests may
be changing the relevant players in the game and possibly the
game's outcome.
"I George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. Sci. 3, 3 (1971).
118 W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 314 (1998);
see also Rodney T. Smith, Canons of Public Choice Analysis of International
Agreements, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A PUBLIC
CHOICE APPROACH 49 (Roland T. Vaubel & Thomas D. Willett eds., 1991) ("Individuals
and organizations spend resources to influence the choice of rules and to affect their
standing within a given set of rules.").
"19 David L. Kaserman et al., To Which Fiddle Does the Regulator Dance? Some
Empirical Evidence, in REGULATORY ISSUES SINCE 1964: THE RISE OF THE
DEREGULATION MOVEMENT 170 (Robert F. Himmelberg ed., 1994).
120 Riker, supra note 75, at 445.
121 The obverse is also true; that is, "what majorities may win at one level of
government may be undone by minorities at another level." KOMESAR, supra note 80, at
75-76.
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As economist Gary Becker argues, it is not the absolute
efficiency of interest groups in producing political pressure that is
important.' 2  Instead, it is the relative efficiency of interest groups
that ultimately determines regulatory outcomes.'23 Therefore,
combining the insights of Riker and Becker, one should expect
that political actors would move from an arena in which they were
relatively politically inefficient into an arena in which they were
relatively politically efficient. In cases in which an interest group
is relatively weak domestically, this positive theory of regulation
would suggest that this group would attempt to move the policy
setting process out of that domestic setting and into a more
advantageous one. That is to say, this domestically disadvantaged
interest group will seek to shift the policy making process from the
domestic arena to, for example, the international arena.
"International institution building is thus domestic politics by
other means."'24
B. The Current State of the Literature
A new body of literature has developed to explain the
emergence of intellectual property as a major international trade
issue.'25 "Inadequate protection of intellectual property undermines
122 Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983).
123 Id.; see also KOMESAR, supra note 80, at 91:
Since the degree to which any expenditures on political action are efficacious
depends in part on the extent of activity by the opposition, increased costs of
political action that decrease the activity of opponents can increase the
productivity of and hence the expenditure on political activity .... Whether and
to what extent increases in costs will decrease political action in general or
political action by any given special interest depends on the net impact of
[indirect or relative cost and direct or absolute cost] changes.
124 Richards, supra note 87, at 11.
125 See Susan K. Sell, The Origins of a Trade Based Approach to Intellectual
Property Protection, 17 Sci. COMM. 163 (1995) ("One of the most significant new issues
in international trade is the protection of intellectual property."); see also Robert
Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize
Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives
Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1069 (1996)
("[I]ntellectual property protection has become a central part of the free trade agenda, as
well as the major global trade agreements."); see generally, MICHAEL P. RYAN,
KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (1998) (explaining contemporary changes in international law and
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the goal of free trade because it leads to trade distortions. Absent
sufficient protection, creators can no longer recover the cost of
their investment in research and development, resulting in lower
production, fewer trading opportunities, and higher costs to the
consumer."'26 "The protection of IP rights becomes an international
trade issue due to the transfer of products, services and knowledge
across borders in connection with international trade and business
transactions."'' 2
From a global economic point of view, permitting piracy
distorts trade like any affirmative governmental intervention. As
exporters or investors are reluctant to introduce products or
transfer technology containing key intellectual property for fear
that such property will be pirated, piracy becomes a barrier to
trade. To the extent that such a trade barrier discourages free trade,
it contributes to a decline in competitiveness in the affected
countries.'28
Susan Sell explores theoretical explanations for the rise of
intellectual property rights onto the trade agenda of the world's
more industrialized countries.'29 Sell tackles the issue of
intellectual property rights in a North-South context. 3' She argues
that "neorealism provides a compelling explanation for the
adoption and substance of stronger policies for intellectual
property protection, but interpretivist neoliberalism offers
important insights to explain the discrepancy between policy
government policy regarding intellectual property protection); SUSAN K. SELL, POWER
AND IDEAS: NoRTH-SouTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST (1998)
(examining the politics and diplomacy of intellectual property rights and antitrust
between developed and developing countries).
126 Leaffer, supra note 31, at 276.
127 Frank J. Garcia, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in the North American
Free Trade Agreement: A Successful Case of Regional Trade Regulation, 8 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 817 (1993).
128 Id. ("Piracy has been defined as 'any unauthorized and uncompensated
reproduction or use of someone else's creative intellectual achievement."') (quoting J.H.
Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a
GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 775 (1989)).
129 Susan K. Sell, Intellectual Property Protection and Antitrust in the Developing
World: Crisis, Coercion, and Choice, 49 INT'L ORG. 315 (1995); SELL, The Origins of a
Trade-Based Approach to Intellectual Property Protection, supra note 125; Sell, POWER
AND IDEAS, supra note 125.
130 SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, supra note 125.
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adoption and implementation."' 3 ' For Sell, neorealism fails to
capture the domestic political support for and opposition to
changes in intellectual property regimes. 
3 2
Sell argues that a variant of neoliberalism that includes a state
learning component is better able to account for changes in state
preferences. "3  Interpretivism inquires into "the origin of
preferences and the substance and redefinitions of interests."'3
States' interests are seen as intersubjective, defined by the
relationship between would-be partners. ' A process of learning
produces a reevaluation of preferences that ultimately leads to a
redefinition of interests. When this process fails to persuade
leaders in a particular state, one of two outcomes is likely. Either
states will fail to agree upon a cooperative solution or the
cooperative solution obtained will go unheeded by certain states.
In Sell's words, "[i]f targeted countries do not accept the value
orientation preferred by the powerful state, and no politically
influential domestic constituency favors the new policies, one can
expect nonimplementation and robust domestic resistance."'36
Sell's interpretation of state action is open to criticism on at
least two fronts. First, states must be immune to reputational
considerations to domestically enact the outcomes of international
negotiation with no intention of implementing that legislation. ' In
other words, states which develop a reputation for signing
international agreements but not living up to their obligations
under those agreements become very poor future bargaining
partners.'38 Such states are likely to find themselves left out of
13' Id. at 176.
132 Id. at 17 ("Structural neorealism is too indeterminate and diffuse to provide
satisfactory explanations of the cases at issue here.").
33 Id. at 21-27.
134 Id. at 22.
135 Id. at 25; see, e.g., Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The
Social Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391 (1996).
136 SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, supra note 125, at 177.
137 THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE 55 (1966) (arguing, in a seminal
work on interstate bargaining, that a state's reputation is important).
138 Barry Nalebuff, Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World, 43 WORLD POL.
313, 315 (1991) (arguing that because states often have imperfect information about the
intentions of other states, "[o]ne primary component of communication is the use of
reputation .... Reputation, based on a long and consistent history of behavior, helps
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future negotiations, as other states find such disregard for
international arrangements unacceptable. 39
Second, national governments must demonstrate to their
domestic constituency that the new international agreement will
not be enforced. That is to say, the government must be able to
credibly commit to ignore laws it has enacted. This is important
for two reasons. On the one hand, if the government enacts laws it
has no intention of implementing, it runs the same problem
domestically as outlined above internationally. More specifically,
national governments that routinely pass laws that they do not
enforce will have more difficulty enforcing laws in the future. On
the other hand, if a national government cannot effectively
commit, then it runs the risk of creating an incentive for domestic
actors to take advantage of new rules and win sets and alter their
actions-thereby creating a new domestic constituency who wants
enforcement.
Other authors have argued that the United States was ill-served
by placing intellectual property rights on the international trade
agenda.4 0 While these authors agree that "U.S. unilateral actions
pushed the issue of intellectual property rights to the fore of the
international negotiating agenda and sufficiently aggravated
countries throughout the world to bring them to the multilateral
negotiating table,"'' they argue that bilateral negotiations were
preferable to multilateral talks because bilateral talks avoided
domestic costs. Gero and Lannan argue that "the multilateral
approach meant that certain U.S. laws and practices would also
have to be altered and thus create domestic American costs, which
were not necessitated by unilateralism."'
42
This conclusion is also incorrect. As illustrated by recent
occurrences in Brazil, when the United States imposes trade
sanctions against a Special 301 target country, those industries in
predict the future").
139 Keohane & Nye, supra note 77, at 743 (arguing that states whose actions are
counter to the principles of international agreements "may incur costs to their
reputations, and therefore to their ability to make future agreements").
140 John Gero & Kathleen Lannan, Trade and Innovation: Unilateralism v.
Multilateralism, 21 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 81 (1995).
'4' Id. at 89.
142 Id.
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the United States that rely on importing targeted products and
consumers who wish to purchase targeted products are adversely
affected.' 3 After trade sanctions were announced against Brazil in
retaliation for lax intellectual property rights,
Opposition to products potentially subject to the sanctions was
heard... from [c]orporate officials from General Electric,
Xerox, Dow Chemical, Rohm & Haas Co., Ford Motors, Black
& Decker and others [who] testified that proposed tariffs would
increase costs from U.S. companies and consumers and would
affect U.S. interests more than Brazilian interests.
44
This clearly indicates that economic sanctions such as Special 301
are not without domestic opponents.'45 By not addressing the
domestic opponents of international economic policy, of which
trade-related intellectual property is a component, these authors
failed to capture the true dynamics of the domestic bargaining that
must accompany international institution building.
Michael Ryan's research suffers in much the same respect as
Gero and Lannan.' 46 Ryan's works on the politics of intellectual
property have been excellent studies, but only so far as they go.
Ryan is correct to argue that the pharmaceutical industry
"demonstrated in the 1980s and 1990s an impressive capacity to
push their interests in Washington and Geneva."'4 7 The lobbying
groups who pushed for increased international intellectual
"43 Myles Getlan, TRIPs and the Future of Section 301: A Comparative Study in
Trade Dispute Resolution, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 173, 218 (1995).
'4 Id. at 189 n.90. General Electric opposed inclusion of imported electrical
breakers; Rohm & Haas opposed inclusion of pesticides; Xerox objected to inclusion of
copying paper; Dow Chemical objected to the inclusion of carbon tetrachloride; Ford
Motor called for the removal of sound amplifiers and windshield wipers; Black and
Decker objected to the inclusion of waffle-makers; and Carrier Corp claimed that it
would have lost $60-$65 million if air conditioners were not removed from the list. Id.;
see also Administration Opens Hearings on Proposed Sanctions in Brazilian
Pharmaceuticals Case, 5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1247 (1988) (noting that General
Electric, Rohm & Haas, Xerox, and Dow Chemical "called for elimination of specific
items from the list of possible targets for sanctions").
145 See Sanctions Hurt U.S. Hong Kong Firms More than China, Executives Say, 9
INT'L TRADE REP. 56, 56-57 (1992) (noting that manufacturers and importers of
appliances, electronic goods, magnets, and antibiotics objected to the use of punitive
tariffs as a means of punishing China because "the decreases in sales as a result of higher
prices would lead to the loss of 39,000 jobs [in the United States]").
146 See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 103; RYAN, supra note 125.
147 RYAN, supra note 125, at 9.
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property standards, of which the pharmaceutical industry was a
major factor, were "well managed, well staffed, well funded, and
effective." '148
What is largely absent from Ryan's analysis is the
consideration of the competitive domestic political environment.
The same Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers Association
(PRMA) that was so effective in promoting its members'
international policy objectives was ineffective in achieving
success domestically. The question that Ryan never asks is: "Why
was the PRMA not as "effective" in the domestic arena as it was
in the international arena?"
IV. Pharmaceuticals in the United States
A. Domestic Losses-The Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
In the United States, where new drugs must pass rigorous
safety and efficacy tests before they can be marketed, the effective
life of a patent is shortened by the length of time a drug is under
review. '9 Initially, U.S. politicians defined their policy choice set
as shorter FDA review times or longer effective patent terms 50
Then in 1978, President Jimmy Carter formed an advisory
committee to investigate industrial innovation in the U.S. 5' One of
the conclusions of those studies was that "the effective patent life
for pharmaceutical products had fallen from 13.6 years to 9.5
148 Id.
149 See STUART 0. SCHWEITZER, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 200-201
(1997) ("Because firms usually seek patent protection as soon as a potential drug
compound is identified, a large portion of the patent period can be taken up by the
sponsor's R&D activities and the US FDA's review of the [New Drug Application]
marketing application."); see generally PETER TEMIN, TAKING YOUR MEDICINE: DRUG
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1980) (providing a history of the regulation of the
drug industry in the United States).
150 E.g., Morton Mintz, Reagan Backed Repeal of Drug Effectiveness Law, WASH.
POST, Dec. 20, 1980, at A9 (quoting President Ronald Reagan, "[a]s long as a drug is
safe, individuals and their doctors should be free to determine whether its use might be
beneficial"); Morton Mintz, Reagan Urged to Lift Price Lid on U.S. Drug Purchases,
WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1980, at A14 (quoting Reagan, "[s]tart the clock on the 17-year
drug patent monopolies not when the patent issues .... but when the FDA... approves
the product for sale").
'51 Peter Gwynee, A Growing R&D Gap, NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1978, at 3.
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years and that this trend was continuing.' '5 2
After Ronald Reagan won the presidency, he too formed a
commission to study U.S. competitiveness.'53 Reagan's Health
Policy Advisory Group, headed by William Walsh, recommended,
among other things, that patents be extended to cover a period
equal to the time required for pre-market testing and regulatory
review.'54 At the opening of the 97th Congress, "the highest drug-
related legislative priority of the pharmaceutical industry, the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association [PMA], Congress, and
the Reagan Administration [were] to extend effective patent
lives. ,55
The idea of increasing patent protection to account for the time
lost due to regulatory compliance had widespread support. The
Washington Post supported the idea because "[i]f 17 years is the
right period for protecting the exclusive rights of inventors, there
is no reason why those subject to federal regulation should be
denied it solely by reason of that regulation."'56 Echoing the Post,
the New York Times offered editorial support for the measure,
citing "the central issue [as] fairness."'5 7 Support in both chambers
for patent term restoration was extensive; estimates ranged as high
as 90 senators and two-thirds of the House backed the idea.
5 8
Legislation was introduced in 1981 that called for patent
extension only for time under regulatory review, thereby limiting
the effective patent life to seventeen years.' 9 S 255, as the measure
was known, passed by voice vote of the full Senate on July 9 of
that year.'6° Representatives Robert Kastenmeier of Wisconsin and
152 Alan D. Lourie, A Political History of Patent Term Restoration: Part 1,
PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, Jan. 1985, at 46.
'53 See Mintz, supra note 150, at A14.
154 Marilou Sturges, Cut! Chop! Energize!, 1 PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, Mar.
1981, at 21-26.
151 Paul Clark, A Question of Priorities, 1 PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, Oct. 1981,
at 46.
156 Patently Fair, WASH. POST, May 20, 1981, at A22.
15 The Half-Life Patents, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1981, at A22.
158 Judee Shuler, Bill Haddad, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, Mar. 1986, at 24, 27.
159 S 255 was introduced on Jan. 27, 1981 by Charles Mathias of Maryland. Lourie,
supra note 152, at 47.
160 Id.
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Howard Sawyer of Illinois introduced a House version of S 255.16l
Before action could be taken in the House, however, a coalition of
opponents of patent term extensions began to form.'62 Bill Haddad,
who had worked for Senator Kefauver during his famous Senate
hearings on the pharmaceutical industry,'63 had recently taken the
post as president and chief executive officer of the Generic
Pharmaceutical Industry Association (GPIA).' Haddad
immediately began to mobilize opposition to the House bill,
which, according to Haddad, "would have destroyed the generic
industry.' 63
Haddad and the GPIA faced an uphill battle. Support in both
chambers for patent term restoration was extensive. 66 To change
congressional minds, Haddad mobilized the generic drug
industry's natural allies: the elderly, represented by the National
Council of Senior Citizens, the American Association of Retired
Persons, the National Retired Teachers Association, big labor,
represented by the AFL-CIO, and consumer advocacy groups such
as Ralph Nader's Health Research Group. 167 Haddad, who had also
worked at the New York Post and New York Herald Tribune,
presented the GPIA's case to the Washington Post and the New
York Times and succeeded in changing both papers' editorial
position on the issue of patent restoration.'68 After endorsing the
original Senate bill because "[i]t would seem to make no sense to
protect a toy for 17 years but an important drug ... for only half
that time,"'69 the New York Times reversed field and declared that
"the law did not intend to guarantee every inventor a clear 17
161 Id. (recording the House version as HR 1937).
162 Caroline E. Mayer, Drug Industry War Heats Up Over Generics; Name Brands
Claim Generics Stifle Research, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1981, at KI.
163 ESTES KEFAUVER, IN A FEW HANDS: MONOPOLY POWER IN AMERICA (1965).
164 Under Haddad's leadership, the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association
replaced the National Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers as the political voice
of the generic drug industry. Shuler, supra note 158, at 26-27.
165 Id. at 27.
166 Id. (Haddad estimated "that the bill had the support of about 90 senators and
two-thirds of the House").
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 The Half-Life Patents, supra note 157, at A22.
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years of market monopoly."' 170
Because the patent restoration measure had already passed the
Senate, the GPIA focused its efforts on the House vote. Haddad
found support in Democratic Representatives Al Gore of
Tennessee and Henry Waxman of California. 7' Through extensive
lobbying, generic proponents were able to add a 'prospectivity'
amendment that precluded extension of patents obtained before the
bill's enactment. "' By denying extensions to patents already
granted, generic manufacturers were assured "that no extension
would come into effect until almost the year 2000.'
17
After the bill was reported out of the Judiciary Committee on
July 28, 1982, HR 6444 (as the bill was now known) was placed
on the suspension calendar.' 74 This meant that the bill could not be
amended on the House floor, but it would require a two-thirds
majority vote to pass. On September 15, 1982, HR 6444 "fell short
by 5 votes of the two-thirds majority required."'17 The House Rules
Committee did not schedule another vote and the measure died in
the House.
When the 98th Congress began, the PMA found that the
political climate had changed considerably. The GPIA and its
supporters had galvanized a core of Democrats in the House led by
Henry Waxman. Waxman introduced HR 3605 which eliminated
the need for generic drug manufacturers to conduct their own
safety and efficacy studies for drugs previously approved for
marketing so long as the generic product was chemically and
biologically equivalent.' 76 Henry Waxman wanted to reinstate the
170 An Unwarranted Patent Stretch, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1982, at A26.
171 See Shuler, supra note 158, at 27.
172 See Lourie, supra note 152, at 48.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. (On the day of the vote "morning fog grounded airplanes in the East and
Midwest and kept a number of positive votes from getting to Washington").
176 See generally TEMIN, supra note 149, at 142 (noting that "the increase in
regulatory stringency during the 1960s roughly doubled the amount of resources needed
to get a drug onto the market"). Before 1962, the FDA had allowed firms wishing to
market copies of approved off-patent drugs to submit Abbreviated New Drug
Applications (ANDA). An ANDA used the safety and efficacy studies performed by the
pioneering firms as evidence of the safety and efficacy of the proposed generic copy.
After 1962, generic drug manufacturers lost this condensed approval process, thereby
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Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) for generics and
HR 3605, which he introduced in July of 1983, was the vehicle.'
While negotiations among the various interests were taking
place, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided the
case of Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. 178
This decision defined patent infringement as any activity of a
commercial nature conducted before a patent's expiration for the
purpose of obtaining data for submission to a federal regulatory
agency. 17 In other words, the Bolar decision made it a crime to do
what the Waxman bill proposed. Now any new legislation would
have to overturn Bolar and redefine patent infringement in such
cases. The ruling made the research pharmaceutical industry
"believe that it was paying too high a price for much more limited
patent term restoration than they had expected to receive." 8 °
Without congressional action on a new ANDA, which seemed
unlikely without a compromise, the Bolar decision provided the
research pharmaceutical industry with a powerful barrier to
generic competition.
Unfortunately for the PMA, a congressional compromise was
forthcoming. The compromise took the form of the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984.8l "The
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act is an
outgrowth of demands for legislative relief by two segments of the
pharmaceutical industry: the marketers of brand-name and generic
increasing the time and cost associated with bringing a generic to market. Id.
177 Alan D. Lourie, A Political History of Patent Term Restoration: Part II,
PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, Feb. 1985, at 44.
178 733 F.2d 858 (1984).
179 Id. at 863.
Bolar's intended "experimental" use is solely for business reasons and not for
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.
Bolar's... use.., to derive FDA required test data is thus an infringement of
the [Roche] patent. Bolar may intend to perform "experiments," but unlicensed
experiments conducted with a view to the adaption of the patented invention to
the experimentor's business is a violation of the rights of the patentee to exclude
others from using his patented invention.
Id.
180 Lourie, supra note 152, at 49.
181 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b (1994); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301
NOTE, 355, 360cc (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271,282 (1994)).
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drugs."'82 For the innovators, the Act provides for the extension of
certain patents, under particular conditions, for a finite period of
time. The Act calls for the original patent applicant to apply for an
extension within 60 days of marketing approval and while the
patent is still valid.'83 The patent may then be extended, at the
discretion of the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, for a
term equal to the regulatory review period, which the Act defines
as the sum of half the investigational period and the full post-
investigational review period, less any time attributable to the
applicant.'84 In any event, the patent extension cannot exceed five
years or produce more than 14 years of effective patent life. 8
The generic industry received its coveted ANDA provisions.
To accomplish this, the Act overrules the Roche v. Bolar decision
by making it legal for generic firms to use information gathered by
the innovating firm in proving that the generic version of a
particular drug is safe and effective. 8 6 To obtain ANDA approval,
a generic firm "need only show that it has the requisite
manufacturing capabilities, that its product is properly labeled,"
and that the product is bioequivalent to the innovating drug.'87 To
182 James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and Pharmaceutical Innovation: The
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 CATH. U. L. REV.
433, 434 (1986); see also S. REP. No. 104-394, at 10 (1996).
The Act struck a careful balance between two important public policy goals. One
goal was to "make available more low cost generic drugs by establishing a generic drug
approval procedure," and the other was to strengthen incentives for pioneering research
and development expenditures by pharmaceutical companies through the "restoration of
some of the time lost on patent life while the product is awaiting pre-market clearance"
from the FDA. Id. (citing H.R REP. No. 857 (Part I), 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 14, 15
(1984)).
183 Alan Kaplan & Robert Becker, An Examination of the ANDA/Patent Restoration
Law, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, Dec. 1984, at 60, 63.
184 Jonah Shacknai & Gregory M. Fisher, The ANDA/Patent Extension Law: What
Lies Within, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, Jan. 1985, at 36, 41.
185 Id.
186 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1) (1999).
187 Kaplan & Becker, supra note 183, at 60; see also Larry Thompson, How Safe
Are the Drugs You Take; Scandal at FDA Raises New Questions About Generic
Medicines, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1989, at Z12.
To see if a generic drug is bioequivalent to a brand-name medicine, researchers
test a group of 10 to 24 healthy volunteers, usually males between the ages of
21 and 35 who are within 10 percent of their ideal body weight. The volunteers
take one dose of the drug while fasting. If the levels of the generic compound in
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facilitate the process of granting ANDAs, the Act requires that the
original patent applicant submit to the FDA the expiration dates of
all patents associated with the product."' 8 The Act also provides the
patent holder only forty-five days within which to file an action
for infringement against an ANDA applicant."9 If the patent holder
fails to bring such an action within the forty-five days, the ANDA
applicant is entitled to bring his or her product to market and
remain there pending the outcome of the litigation.19
Table 1: Effect of Waxman-Hatch Act on Overall Market
Exclusivity for Pioneer Drugs'9'
Before Act After Act
Effective Patent Life 9 years 11.7 years
Period between patent 5-8 years 0 years
expiry and entry of
generics
Total period of intellectual 14-17 years 11.7 years
property protection
Financial Investment by $ 10-100 million > $1 million
generic firms to gain
.approval
The impact of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984 on the research pharmaceutical industry
has been significant. A Congressional Budget Office study
concluded that the Act's streamlined, abbreviated new drug
approval process has increased generic competition.'92 The
expansion of generic competition has "lowered the average returns
the blood are the same as the blood levels of the brand-name drug, the two are
considered equivalent and the drug is approved.
Id.
188 Kaplan & Becker, supra note 183, at 60.
189 Shacknai & Fisher, supra note 184, at 43.
190 Id.
19' SCRIP'S YEARBOOK 1997 tbl.5.3.20 (1997).
192 S. REP. No. 104-394, at 11 ("ANDA's are vastly less expensive to secure than
approval for a pioneer drug. Some ANDA's are obtained with an investment of less than
$100,000 and most cost less than $1 million.").
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from marketing a new drug by roughly 12 percent (or $27 million
in 1990 dollars)."'93
Before the Act (in 1983), only 35% of the top-selling drugs no
longer under patent had generic copies available. Today, nearly all
do. At the same time, the share of their market that those drugs
lose to generic competition has also expanded dramatically. In
1980, generic drugs accounted for only about 13% of the total
quantity of prescriptions sold for multi-source drugs. Fourteen
years later, they constituted 58% of the total quantity of multiple-
source prescriptions dispensed.'94
A sign of the success of the Act is the speed with which
research firms lose market share after patent expiry:
In the first half of 1993, U.S. brand-name pharmaceutical
companies lost an average of 53% of market share to generic
competition within a year after expiry of patent protection on
their products. In 1989-91, the average loss of market share
within a year on products whose patents had expired was 39
percent, rising to 49 percent in 1992.9'
The situation is even worse if one looks at the top selling drugs.' 96
In one of the most celebrated cases, Glaxo Wellcome's anti-
ulcer drug Zantac, the most prescribed drug in the world, lost 60
percent of its U.S. market share within four months of its patent
expiry in August of 1997.9' Glaxo Wellcome estimates that in a
worst case scenario, 70-80 percent of Zantac's U.S. sales would be
eroded in the first year following generic competition.'98 Given
Zantac's 1996 sales, that represents a loss for Glaxo Wellcome of
some $1.3 billion.' 9  Assuming Glaxo Wellcome would have
maintained its sales of Zantac at 1996 levels, the passage of the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act reduced
193 CONG. BUDGET OFF., How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY ix (1998).
,94 Id. at 37.
'9' SCRIP'S YEARBOOK 1995 376 (1995).
196 See infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
197 SCRIP'S YEARBOOK 1998 1 (1998).
198 Id. at 20 1.
199 Glaxo Wellcome's sales of Zantac in the US totaled $1.63 billion in 1996.
Generic Zantac Marketing Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1997, at D4.
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Glaxo's U.S. sales figures between $4.89 and $13.1 billion."0
Given the above, it seems hard to argue that the research
pharmaceutical industry won the battle over patent term
restoration."0 ' Therefore, it seems equally premature to assume that
the political power of the U.S. research pharmaceutical industry
made the imposition of increased intellectual property rights
abroad a foregone conclusion. Rather, it is entirely consistent with
the then current domestic political climate that the U.S. research
pharmaceutical industry would find itself losing support not only
for increased patent rights abroad, but also for effective patent
rights at home.
B. Pharmaceuticals-The International Environment
Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, new technology
made reverse engineering of drugs easier and less expensive. This
trend led to the proliferation of firms, primarily in the developing
world, "pirating" the patented products of U.S. and European
pharmaceutical manufacturers."2 Many third world countries had
developed production-scale chemical synthesis capabilities similar
to what was available in the United States in the 1950s.0 3 While
this level of technological sophistication is inadequate to innovate
new drugs, it is entirely adequate to reproduce an existing
200 The Act reduced the time between patent expiry and generic marketing approval
from between three (3 x 1.63 = 4.89) to eight (8 x 1.63 = 13.1) years to less than one
year. See ScRIP'S YEARBOOK 1997 tbl.5.3.20, supra note 191; CONG. BUDGET OFF.,
supra note 193.
201 See, e.g., Raymond Brastow & David Rystrom, Wealth Effects of the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 32 AM. ECONOMIST 59 (1988)
(arguing that, based on stock values, the generic drug companies benefited more than
research firms); Ralph A. Lewis, The Emerging Effects of the Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 361, 367
(1992) (arguing that "[t]he tremendous growth of the generic drug industry has come at
the expense of the brand name industry and has fostered stiff competition between the
two").
202 Leaffer, supra note 31, at 280 ("The incidence of piracy, both in the United
States and abroad, has increased exponentially in the past decade. This trend will
continue in large part because reproductive technologies have improved and become cost
efficient, and the gap between the creation costs and reproduction costs has increased.").
Pirating is the term that pharmaceutical companies use to describe the unlicensed
production of patented drugs. Weissman, supra note 125, at 1088-89.
203 Letter from Gary M. Pollack, Ph.D., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
Department of Pharmacy (July 30, 1998) (on file with author).
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formulation. The chemical structure of a patented drug, and often
its chemical synthesis, can be found either in the patent application
or published in the pharmaceutical literature." To begin
unlicensed production of a patented drug, an interested party need
merely invest in the "scale-up" process, a method which involves
transferring a bench-level synthesis or extraction scheme to a
procedure that could produce kilogram quantities of the active
drug." 5  "If one ignores the patent protection, then the
'development process' is really quite simple." 20 6
The industrialization of those developing countries that did not
offer patent protection for pharmaceuticals encouraged domestic
firms to engage in the unlicensed production of drugs that were
under patent in other countries. U.S. pharmaceutical firms became
concerned about this practice for two reasons.0 7 First, unlicensed
sales of patented drugs translated into current dollars lost. The
unlicensed producers paid no royalty for the right to sell a patented
drug, and therefore the patent-holder was unable to fully
appropriate the income that his or her innovation generated.
Second, those countries without adequate intellectual property
protection could be classified as higher risk countries for
investment. As pharmaceutical firms in the developed countries
searched for external markets for their products, they were
confronted with the prospect of greater risks and lower
appropriability. According to Harvey Bale, Vice President of the
PMA, "[c]ompeting overseas is... the difference in reaching the
204 Glenn Law, Liability under the Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988 for the
Use of a Patented Process Outside the United States, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 245, 247
(1991).
205 Letter from Gary M. Pollack, supra note 203; see also Milt Freudenheim,
Johnson & Johnson Looks Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1995, § 2, at 27 (quoting the
chairman of Johnson & Johnson: "With computers and chemistry, scientists can go
around patents much faster now. Within a year or two, you usually have somebody else
right on your heels.").
206 Letter from Gary M. Pollack, supra note 203.
207 Carla A. Hills, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Statement
before the Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop., and the Admin. of Justice of the House
Judiciary Comm. on July 25, 1989, reprinted in DEP'T OF STATE BULL., Nov., 1989
hereinafter Statement of Carla A. Hills] ("First, U.S. companies lose exports and foreign
sales, royalties, and the value of investments in the market where the American
intellectual property right is appropriated without compensation. Second, our firms lose
sales in third markets when unauthorized products are sold there.").
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break-even point on the financial curve. '  The more foreign
markets offering strict intellectual property protection for
pharmaceuticals, the quicker U.S. research pharmaceutical firms
could recoup the enormous research and development costs
associated with bringing a new drug to market.
C. Pharmaceuticals-An International Solution to a
Domestic Problem: The Omnibus Trade Act of 1988
The U.S. research pharmaceutical industry recognized the need
to couple an international strategy for improving intellectual
property standards with a domestic strategy of increasing the
significance of intellectual property protection in U.S. trade
policy.2 9 In short, they sought to act as herestheticians, adding
"theft" or "piracy" as another dimension in the domestic debate
about pharmaceuticals and patents. The strategy that the research
pharmaceutical industry adopted was a two-pronged effort. First,
the research pharmaceutical industry began educating lawmakers
and the public about the importance of the intellectual property-
intensive sector to the U.S. economy and of intellectual property
rights to that sector.21° Second, the intellectual property-intensive
industries began to lobby Congress to revise U.S. trade law to
incorporate the enforcement of intellectual property as a
prerequisite for continued, unfettered access to the U.S. market."'
First, the pharmaceutical industry was able to frame the issue
of intellectual property protection by using the term "piracy" to
refer to the unlicensed use of intellectual property. According to
Weissman, "[t]he piracy metaphor effectively changed a policy
debate into an absolutist moral drama. Theft is simply wrong, and
theft by violence is even worse. There is no room for a policy
discussion about the merits of piracy, nor any space for
compromise in the direction of pirates."2 '2
208 Freudenheim, supra note 205, at 27.
209 See Weissman, supra note 125, at 1075 (arguing that the pharmaceutical
industry's "main strategy was to persuade U.S. policy makers to coerce Third World
countries to adopt restrictive patent rules").
210 Id. at 1076-77; see also RYAN, supra note 125, at 69.
211 Weissman, supra note 125, at 1076.
212 Id. at 1088. But see Leaffer, supra note 31, at 274 ("The term 'piracy' has no
settled meaning in international law.").
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The pharmaceutical industry, acting as a heresthetician, was
incredibly successful in adding the "piracy" dimension to the
debate regarding drugs.23 The industry spokespeople began to
characterize the lack of patent protection in foreign countries as
criminal..2 " Harvey E. Bale, Jr., Senior Vice-President of the PMA,
called the theft of intellectual property "the biggest obstacle to
foreign market access."2 '5 PMA President Gerald J. Mossinghoff
alleged that "[t]here is no country in the world where patent piracy
of valuable patented medicines has been more rampant or
unchecked than India."2 6 A PMA press release condemned "[t]he
Thai government's support for patent piracy [that] allowed drug
pirates to produce low quality and dangerous medicines.
2 7
The U.S. media followed suit soon thereafter, criticizing
foreign governments for supporting such illegal behavior. India
and Brazil were called the "worst villains. ' 21'8 The Washington
Post, the same paper that flip-flopped on patent term extension,
exclaimed, "[p]iracy of copyrights, patents and other intellectual
property costs the U.S. economy tens of billions of dollars and
thousands of lost jobs every year. 2 9 The New York Times, which
also reversed its position during the patent term extension debate,
declared "[p]iracy of intellectual property ...costs American
manufacturers between $8 billion and $20 billion a year."2
Finally, the U.S. government began to portray the lack of
intellectual property protection as stealing. President Reagan
became convinced of the vulnerability of the intellectual property
of U.S. corporations and pledged new efforts to protect intellectual
property rights, stating that "[w]hen governments permit
counterfeiting or copying of American products, it is stealing our
213 See infra notes 218-30 and accompanying text.
214 See infra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
215 John Pearson et al., The Patent Pirates Are Finally Walking the Plank, Bus.
WK., Feb. 17, 1992, at 125.
216 U.S. Cites India for Lack of Adequate Patent Protection but Delays Retaliation,
9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 385 (Mar. 4, 1992).
217 USTR Finds Against Thailand on Patents, Delays Action Until After Thai
Election, 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 478, 479 (Mar. 18, 1992).
218 Pearson, supra note 215, at 125.
219 Gary M. Hoffman & George T. Marcou, Who's Stealing America's Ideas?,
WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1989, at C3.
220 Calvin Sims, Wounded by Patent Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1987, at D1.
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future and it is no longer free trade., 221 U.S. Trade Representative
Clayton K. Yeutter said in a press conference, "I see no difference
at all between stealing the patent for a product and stealing the
product itself .... Thievery is thievery. 222 Referring to the lack of
strong intellectual property protection Yeutter stated, "[t]hat's
really an indefensible way to run a society. I don't see how any
nation in the world can defend piracy as a means of keeping
consumer costs down., 223  Pete Wilson, then Senator from
California, called "for an end to foreign rip-offs of U.S. companies
that produce records, movies, pharmaceuticals, computer software,
and other products that have been pirated to the tune of billions of
dollars each year., 224 Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) said that
"America's economic advantage is its technology and innovation"
and that "we need to stop the piracy of American intellectual
property in order to protect this edge."22 '
However, action in Congress was more important than the
declarations of politicians. Hearings were held to address the
inadequacy of intellectual property protection abroad. The hearing
titles ranged from the innocuous ("Intellectual Property and
Trade") 26 to the aggressive ("International Piracy Involving
Intellectual Property"). 227 Regardless of the title, the outcome was
221 Bruce Stokes, Intellectual Piracy Captures the Attention of the President and
Congress, NAT'L J., Feb. 22, 1986, at 443.
222 John Burgess, Global Product Piracy May Be Costing Firms Billions, WASH.
POST, Feb. 27, 1988, at B2.
223 John Burgess, U.S. Fighting to Protect 'Intellectual Property', WASH. POST,
Dec. 6, 1987, at HI.
224 USTR Defends Administration's Naming of Japan, India, Brazil Under Super
301, 6 INT'L TRADE REP. 684, 685 (May 31, 1989).
225 Problems of Trade, Intellectual Property Are Focus of American Bar Showcase
Session, 3 INT'LTRADE REP. 1063 (Aug. 20, 1986).
226 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice, Comm. on the Judiciary. House, Feb. 19, Apr. 23, May 21,
1986; see also Intellectual Property Rights, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
International Trade, Comm. on Finance. Senate, May 14, 1986; Status of Intellectual
Property Protection, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Pol'y and Trade,
Comm. on Foreign Affairs. House, July 31, 1986; Intellectual Property and Trade: 1987,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
Justice, Comm. on the Judiciary. House, Mar. 18, 26, 1987.
227 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade, Productivity, and Economic Growth,
Comm. on Econ. Joint, Mar. 31, 1986; see also Unfair Foreign Trade Practices, Stealing
American Intellectual Property: Imitation Is Not Flattery, Comm. Print issued by the
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the same: Congress became convinced that stronger intellectual
property protection abroad was of fundamental importance to
continuing U.S. international economic competitiveness. 28 As
Carla A. Hills told the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual
Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary
Committee,
Americans who engage in international trade are very concerned
about the harm to U.S. trading interests that results from the lack
of adequate and effective protection of intellectual property
rights in many foreign markets. Our businesses are losing
money, but more importantly, our economy is losing the
competitive edge we gain from research and development,
innovation and creativity. As a nation, we simply cannot afford
it.
229
A 1988 study by the U.S. International Trade Commission
concluded that U.S. companies could be losing between $43
billion and $61 billion in worldwide sales because foreign
competitors were unfairly copying or stealing U.S. intellectual
property."O
Given their exposure to intellectual property piracy, it is not
surprising to find that the research pharmaceutical industry led the
Comnt. on Energy and Com. House, Feb. 1984.
228 See Burgess, supra note 222.
Washington once tended to look on piracy abroad as a nuisance. Now it is seen as a
threat to U.S. economic vitality and one of the most serious of trade barriers facing U.S.
manufacturers, on the assumption that piracy in a foreign country means that legitimate
U.S. products will be shut out. "We get down to technology as the principle determinant
of our competitiveness," said [U.S. Trade Representative Carl] Yeutter. Id.
19 U.S.C. § 2242 states:
(a) The Congress finds that
(A) international protection of intellectual property rights is vital to the
international competitiveness of United States persons that rely on
protection of intellectual property rights; and
(B) the absence of adequate and effective protection of United States
intellectual property rights, and the denial of fair and equitable market
access, seriously impede the ability of the United States persons that rely on
protection of intellectual property rights to export and operate overseas,
thereby harming the economic interests of the United States.
§ 1303, 19 U.S.C. § 2242 NOTE.
229 Statement of Carla A. Hills, supra note 207.
230 Burgess, supra note 222, at B2.
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way among the U.S. intellectual property-intensive industries. The
pharmaceutical industry relies on intellectual property protection
more than any other U.S. industry. 23' As such, the industry's trade
association, the PMA,232 took the lead in promoting the need for
increased intellectual property protection internationally. "PMA,
one of the best organized, sufficiently funded, and powerful
associations, has a long history of promoting IP protection around
the world, with a specific focus on patent, trademark, and trade
secret laws." '233  The pharmaceutical industry increased its
considerable political clout by remaining one of the few U.S.
industries to enjoy a trade surplus throughout the deficit-plagued
1980s.3
Table 2: US Pharmaceutical and Medicinal Products Trade in
1988 in $ million35
1988 % change 1987
Exports 3,941.3 +23.8 3,182.1
Imports 1,859.2 +27.7 1,455.6
Trade Surplus 2,082.1 +20.6 1,726.5
231 Julio Nogues, Patents and Pharmaceutical Drugs: Understanding the Pressures
on Developing Countries, 24 J. OF WORLD TRADE 81 (1990) (citing a survey of
American industry reporting that the pharmaceutical industry would not have developed
or introduced sixty-five percent of its inventions in the absence of patent protection. The
next highest response, the closely related chemical industry, was only thirty percent.)
(citing Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, MGMT. ScI., Feb.
1986)); see also Richard Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial
Research and Development, Yale University Working Paper, 1984 ("Recent interesting
work suggests that there are wide differences among industries in the efficacy of patents.
In the drug industry patents appear to be fairly effective, while in the semiconductor
industry, they are considerably less so.") (cited in SHARON M. OSTER, MODERN
COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS (1994)).
232 The association would later change its name to the Pharmaceutical Research
Manufacturers Association to better differentiate itself from the generic drug industry.
233 Liu, supra note 16, at 106-07.
234 Milt Freudenheim, Pharmaceuticals Are Amongst the Few U.S. Products that
Generate a Trade Surplus, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1992, at A49; see also Burgess, supra
note 223, at HI ("In an era of high trade deficits, products that fall under the rubric of
intellectual property are among the few that consistently are running a surplus. The
world ... uses U.S. medicines and pharmaceuticals en masse... , with $3.1 billion
worth sold abroad in 1986.").
235 SCRIP'S YEARBOOK 1989 (1989).
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One of the reasons the pharmaceutical industry was so capable
in its lobbying efforts was their liberal use of former government
officials. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association hired
Gerald Mossinghoff as its president.236 Mr. Mossinghoff had spent
the previous five years as the Assistant Commerce Secretary and
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks in the Reagan
administration.23 As Vice President, the PMA hired Harvey E.
Bale, Jr., who had worked for twelve years at the U.S. Trade
Representative's Office.238
The first major foreign economic policy victory for the
pharmaceutical industry came in the 1984 revisions to Section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974.29 The 1974 Section 301 legislation was
"broadly directed at foreign restrictions on US trade and [was]
used to enforce trade rights as conferred by GATT and by bilateral
treaties. '24" As amended in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, the
scope of Section 301 has expanded beyond unreasonable trade
practices to include such things as inadequate workers' rights,
export targeting and anticompetitive practices." ' Ambassador
Clayton Yeutter, U.S. Trade Representative, called Section 301
"the H-bomb of trade policy" because it authorized the U.S.T.R. to
demand unrequited trade concessions from America's trading
partners.242 Many in Congress felt, however, that the United States
was not using its H-bomb enough.
2 43
236 Weissman, supra note 125, at 1076.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 See Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948. Ironically,
the revisions to Section 301 that were included in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 came
in the same year that the pharmaceutical industry was forced to compromise with the
generic drug industry on a piece of domestic legislation titled the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act-a measure that benefited generic firms
more than research firms. Id.
240 Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview, in AGGRESSIVE
UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 2
(Jagdhish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990).
241 Id.
242 Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act: A
Legislative History of the Amendments to Section 301, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM:
AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 49, 52 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990).
243 Id. at 58.
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Congress' answer, its "thermonuclear bomb" of foreign
economic policy, came in the form of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Omnibus Trade Act).2" The
Omnibus Trade Act declares that the "international protection of
intellectual property rights is vital to the international
competitiveness of United States persons that rely on protection of
intellectual property rights." '245
The Omnibus Trade Act defined the "Overall and Principal
Trade Negotiating Objectives of the United States.""2 6 To ensure
244 Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988); see also U.S.T.R. Fact Sheets on
Super 301 Trade Liberalization Priorities and Special 301 on Intellectual Property, 6
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 715, 719 (1989):
The U.S.T.R. also noted that the focus on... intellectual property efforts in
trade negotiations coincided with the inclusion of provisions on intellectual
property in various U.S. trade statutes. This statutory development began almost
a decade ago with an amendment to section 301 in Senator Danforth's
reciprocity bill which was enacted as part of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988's Special 301 provisions
continued this Congressional priority, and its implementation has contributed
positively to U.S. efforts to ensure adequate and effective intellectual property
protection.
245 Omnibus Trade Act, § 1303(a)(1)(A), 102 Stat. 1179 (1988).
246 19 U.S.C. § 2901, 100 Pub. L. No. 418, 102 Stat. 1107, § 1 101(b)(10). According
to the Act,
The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding intellectual
property are:
(A) to seek the enactment and effective enforcement by foreign countries of
laws which
(i) recognize and adequately protect intellectual property, including
copyrights, patents, trademarks, semiconductor chip layout designs,
and trade secrets, and
(ii) provide protection against unfair competition;
(B) to establish in the GATT obligations
(i) to implement adequate substantive standards based on
(I) the standards in existing international agreements that provide
adequate protection, and
(II) the standards in national laws if international agreement
standards are inadequate or do not exist,
(ii) to establish effective procedures to enforce, both internally and at
the border, the standards implemented under clause (i), and
(iii) to implement effective dispute settlement procedures that improve
on existing GATT procedures;
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that the intellectual property rights of Americans were enforced
abroad, the Act amended Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. As
amended, the Act defines as unreasonable, "[a]n act, policy, or
practice... while not necessarily in violation of, or inconsistent
with, the international legal rights of the United States, is
otherwise unfair and inequitable. 14 7 The Act specifically includes
as unreasonable "any act, policy, or practice, or any combination
of acts, policies, or practices, which ... denies fair and equitable
provision of adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property rights.1
48
Within the Omnibus Trade Act is an intellectual property-
specific measure titled Special 301. 9 Special 301 is the name
commonly used to describe Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974,
as amended by the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act. Congress created
Special 301 to address the "growing problem of inadequate and
ineffective intellectual property protection. 150 "Special 301 was,
and continues to be, based on the assumption that the United
States could use threats and negotiation to obtain meaningful
changes in the intellectual property regimes of its trading
partners."2 51
Special 301 directs the U.S. Trade Representative to identify,
within thirty days after submission of the annual National Trade
Estimates (foreign trade barriers) report to Congress, those foreign
countries that "deny adequate and effective protection of
intellectual property rights, '' 1 2 or "deny fair and equitable market
access to United States persons that rely upon intellectual property
(C) to recognize that the inclusion in the GATI of
(i) adequate and effective substantive norms and standards for the
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, and
(ii) dispute settlement provisions and enforcement procedures.
Id.
247 § 1301; see also 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (d)(3)(A).
248 § 1301; see also 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (d)(3)(B).
249 Omnibus Trade Act, §§ 1301, 1303, 102 Stat. 1164-76, 1179-81 (1988)
(amending the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-316, §§ 302(b), § 182 (1974)).
250 S. REP. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 74-75 (1987).
251 John Gero & Kathleen Lannan, Trade and Innovation: Unilateralism v.
Multilateralism, 21 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 81, 84 (1995).
252 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a)(1)(A) (1988).
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protection." '253 "Special 301 was devised solely to enhance the
protection of intellectual property rights by foreign governments,
and it demands that investigations be conducted on an expedited
basis, faster than a normal section 301 investigation. 254
While Section 1303 of the Omnibus Trade and Tariff Act
enumerates only one category-priority foreign country-in
implementing this legislation, the Trade Representative has
promulgated three additional classifications (bringing the total
number to four, listed as follows in descending degree of severity):
Priority Foreign Country, Priority Watch List, Watch List, and
Special Mention.255 The U.S.T.R. must then within six months
complete an investigation and seek to negotiate a bilateral
settlement. If the U.S.T.R. is unable to remedy the situation, it is
authorized, but not required, to retaliate by increasing duties or
imposing other trade restrictions.
The Watch List is the least serious of the Special 301
categories. Countries placed on the Watch List are put on notice
that the U.S. believes that the country's intellectual property
regime is lacking in some capacity. The first Watch List contained
Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia,
Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Spain,
Turkey, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.256 Watch List-ed countries can
expect to be in regular contact with the U.S.T.R.
If a Watch List-ed country fails to satisfy U.S. demands for
improved intellectual property protection, that country faces the
possibility of being upgraded to Priority Watch List grading.
Typically, for a Priority Watch List country the U.S.T.R. has
formed some set of precise objectives towards which the relevant
country must work in order to satisfy U.S. demands. The U.S.T.R.
initially listed Brazil, India, Republic of Korea, Mexico, China,
Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and Thailand on the Priority Watch List.
27
253 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a)(1)(B) (1988).
254 Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "Special 301": Its Requirements,
Implementation, and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259, 263 (1990).
255 19 U.S.C. § 2420, § 310(a)(I)(B).
256 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Fact Sheet "Special 301" on
Intellectual Property, May 25, 1989, reprinted in 6 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 22, 719
(May 31, 1989).
257 Id.
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If the U.S.T.R.'s efforts fail at this second stage, a country may
be designated a Priority Foreign Country (PFC). "Priority Foreign
Countries are those on trade's death row.""25 These countries have
"the most onerous or egregious acts, policies, or practices" with
respect to intellectual property protection.259 Priority Foreign
Countries are likely to face retaliatory trade sanctions if they do
not quickly move to remedy their intellectual property regime's
shortcomings.
The U.S.T.R. must employ three criteria to identify a Priority
Foreign Country. First, does the country's intellectual property
regime deny adequate protection or market access to those who
rely on intellectual property protection?2 61 Second, does the
country's intellectual property regime have an actual or potential
impact on the relevant U.S. products?2 6' Third, has the country
entered into negotiations or made significant progress towards
remedying the inadequate protection problem?262 When the answer
to the first two questions is yes, and the answer to the last question
is no, the U.S.T.R. designates the country as a Priority Foreign
Country and begins Special 301 proceedings.
Special 301 relies on the "fire-alarm" oversight method.2
63
Clearly neither Congress nor the U.S.T.R. can be expected to
closely monitor the intellectual property regimes of all U.S.
trading partners. Therefore, the provisions of Special 301 allow
private interests-for example, U.S. intellectual property-intensive
industries-to submit complaints to the U.S.T.R. regarding what
those interests consider to be actionable Special 301 violations.26"
"U.S. industries, associations, and private persons play a major
role in the Special 301 process by providing firsthand information
258 Drahos, supra note 62, at 51.
259 Id.
260 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(1)(A) (1994).
261 Id. § 2242(b)(1)(B).
262 Id. § 2242(b)(1)(C).
263 Mark D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCi. 165 (1984).
264 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) (1994). "Any interested person may file a petition with
the Trade Representative requesting that action be taken under section 301 [19 U.S.C.S.
§ 24111 and setting forth the allegations in support of the request." Id.; see also Liu,
supra note 16, at 98 (stating that by the end of 1992, there had been ninety cases of
Section 301 investigations, seventy-two of which were instituted by industries).
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on foreign trade practices and assisting in the development of trade
strategy. Throughout the review process, the United States Trade
Representative solicits and accepts submissions from interested
parties., 265 The U.S.T.R. uses that information in determining
whether Special 301 actions should be initiated against those
countries alleged to be violating the intellectual property rights of
U.S. intellectual property-intensive industry.
V. Canada
A. Canada-A History of Compulsory Licensing
Canada is an important trading partner for the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry. In 1992, U.S. pharmaceutical companies
exported $845 million in pharmaceuticals to Canada.266 Together,
Canada and Mexico account for fifteen percent of all U.S.
exported pharmaceuticals.26 It should come as no surprise,
therefore, that Canada's system of granting compulsory licenses
for patented pharmaceuticals is considered unfair by the U.S.
research pharmaceutical industry.268 It is also not surprising that the
U.S. research pharmaceutical industry attempted to make
compulsory licensing an important issue in U.S.-Canada trade
relations.269
Because Canada and the United States share a common
265 Thomas C. Bickham, Protecting U.S. Intellectual Property Rights Abroad with
Special 301, 23 AIPLA Q.J. § 2, 195, 197 (1995).
266 Silberman, supra note 20, at 621 (citing Pharmaceuticals, MEX. TRADE & L.
REP., July 1, 1994, at 24).
267 Id. (noting that of the $987 million in U.S. pharmaceutical exports to Canada and
Mexico, only $142 million, or just over fourteen percent, are to Mexico, indicating that
as between Canada and Mexico, Canada is by far the larger consumer of U.S.
pharmaceutical products).
268 A Licensing Law that Hurts U.S. Drugmakers, Bus. WK., Mar. 1, 1982, at 34
(quoting William M. Robson, President of the research pharmaceutical company Smith
Kline & French Canada Ltd., as saying the law amounted to expropriation of patent
rights).
269 David Crane Star, Trade Talks Jeopardizing Drug Prices, Expert Says, TORONTO
STAR, Nov. 20, 1991, at C9 (reporting that Robert Sherwood, a U.S. expert on
intellectual property law, had stated that the "granddaddy" issue in the North American
Free Trade Area negotiations was the Canadian treatment of compulsory licenses for
pharmaceutical patents). "It is a repeat of the issue fought out so intensely in the
Canadian-U.S. free trade agreement just a few years ago." Id.
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jurisprudence, it is not surprising that the intellectual property
regimes of the two countries are rather similar."' The most
significant difference between the U.S. and Canada is that the
Canadian regime has historically been very liberal in granting
compulsory licenses."'
Canada's use of compulsory licensing dates back to the 1923
amendments to the Patent Act. 2  Those amendments allowed
"individuals or corporations to apply to the Commissioner of
Patents for a compulsory license to use a patented process to
manufacture a drug in Canada. 2" Given the size of the Canadian
market, the requirement that the compulsory licensed drug be
manufactured domestically led to an underutilization of
compulsory licensing for pharmaceuticals.
2
1
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the price of patented
drugs became a growing political concern. In 1961, the Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission (RTPC) issued its Report Concerning
the Manufacture, Distribution and Sale of Drugs.275 This report
concluded that "drug prices were excessive; that there was little
price competition; and that patents inhibited competition.q276 The
Royal Commission on Patents, Copyrights and Industrial Designs,
also known as the Ilsley Commission, had reached similar
conclusions in 1960.277 The Royal Commission on Health Services,
270 Garcia, supra note 127, at 829. "Canada and the United States are familiar with
each other's [intellectual property] enforcement system because of geographic proximity
and similar common law traditions." Id. But see Silbermann, supra note 20, at 620-21
(noting that while patent laws in both the United States and Canada perceive patent
rights as a vehicle to encourage invention, the two differ philosophically in that the
Canadian system is also designed to insure that new inventions will be manufactured in
Canada on a commercial scale without delay).
273 See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (stating
that compulsory licensing is a rarity in the U.S. patent system).
272 Joel Lexchin, Pharmaceuticals, Patents, and Politics: Canada and Bill C-22, 23
INT'L J. HEALTH SERVS. 147, 148 (1993).
273 Id.
274 Id.; see generally David J. Fowler & Myron J. Gordon, The Effect of Public
Policy Initiatives on Drug Prices in Canada, 10 CAN. PUB. POL'Y 64, 65 (1984).
275 CAMPBELL & PAL, supra note 6, at 32 (citing RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
COMMISSION, REPORT CONCERNING THE MANUFACTURE, DISTRIBUTION AND SALE OF
DRUGS (1963)).
276 Id.
277 Id. (citing ROYAL COMMISSION ON PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS AND INDUSTRIAL
[Vol. 26
2001] PROTECTION OF PHARMACEUTICALS AS FOREIGN POLICY 507
also known as the Hall Commission, concluded in its 1964 report
that "either the industry will make... drugs available at the lowest
possible cost, or it will be necessary for... government to do
SO. ' 9278
Rising drug costs and greater political scrutiny led the Liberal
government in 1967 to introduce Bill C-190.179 As proposed,
C- 190 would allow compulsory licensing to import prescription
drugs.2 0 Allowing compulsory licensees to import patented drugs
would eliminate the largest barrier to entry: the manufacturing
restriction.
The compliance provisions were fairly simple. According to
the compulsory licensing provisions, the Commissioner of Patents
was obliged, under the Act as it then existed, to grant a license to
the applicant unless there was a good reason not to grant the
license.28' The Commission of Patents also had the power to set the
royalty rates, which were somewhat arbitrarily set at four percent
of the "licensee's selling price.
'
,
282
Needless to say, the research pharmaceutical industry was
adamantly opposed to C-190. Industry experts "estimated that the
net present value to the originator of Canadian sales of such a drug
would be reduced through compulsory licensing by 44% of the
original value. ' '283 The lobbying group that represents those
interests, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of
Canada (PMAC) lobbied furiously against the change.28 The
DESIGNS, REPORT (1960)).
278 Id. at n.9 (citing ROYAL COMMISSION ON HEALTH SERVICES, REPORT 40 (1964)).
279 Id. at 33.
280 Id.
281 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd., [1998] S.C.R. LEXIS 37, 19; see also Frank
W. Homer v. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., [1970] 61 C.P.R. 243, 243.
282 Paul K. Gorecki & Ida Henderson, Compulsory Patent Licensing of Drugs in
Canada, 7 CAN. PUB. POL'Y 559, 560 (1981); see Homer, 61 C.P.R. at 245 (stating that
the royalty was fixed at 4% of the net selling price of the medicine by the applicant in its
final dosage form as sold to purchasers at arm's length); see also BRIAN G. BRUNSVOLD
& DENNIS P. O'REILLY, DRAFrING PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS 94 (4th ed. 1998)
(noting that under U.S. practice, royalty rates are not fixed and can be more than fifty
percent).
283 Smith Kline & French Labs., Ltd. et al. v. Att'y Gen. of Can., [1985] 7 C.P.R.3d
145, 164.
284 Joel Lexchin, Drug Lobby Hasn't Finished with Canada Yet, TORONTO STAR,
Sept. 19, 1990, at A25 (arguing that the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 26
PMAC's opposition effort cost the group an estimated
CDN$250,000 annually.285 The compulsory licensing system was
challenged on civil rights grounds,28 on constitutional grounds,
287
and as ultra vires of the Parliament.288 "By 1971, of the 69 licenses
issued there had been 43 appeals before the courts. 2 89 The
Canadian courts took notice of this trend and admonished PMAC
members to cease the seemingly reflexive practice of bringing suit
challenging all compulsory licenses.29°
Even though the compulsory licensing law was already more
than a decade old, compulsory licensing became an important
trade issue for the United States when Ronald Reagan became
president in 1981.9 U.S. research drug companies began to report
that the effects of Canada's compulsory licensing system were
threatening the industry's profitability.292 The industry was also
Canada (PMAC) fought compulsory licensing every step of the way).
285 Lexchin, supra note 272, at 148.
26 Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Comm'r of Patents, [1970] 62 C.P.R. 155, 160
(O.A.C.) (expressing the court's opinion that the amending legislation did not deal with
civil rights as such, but only as incidental to the matter of patents and was not ultra vires
Parliament).
287 Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Comm'r of Patents, [1982] 68 C.P.R.2d 257 (F.C.)
(holding that Canada's compulsory licensing laws did not conflict with Canada's Bill of
Rights protection of property).
288 Smith Kline et al., 7 C.P.R.3d at 176 (concluding that "this subsection, by
making the grant of a patent for medicine subject to compulsory licensing is simply
limiting the scope of the property right, the monopoly, which Parliament is authorized
but not obliged to grant").
289 Lexchin, supra note 272, at 148.
290 See Lilly v. S & U Chemicals Ltd., [1973] 9 C.P.R.2d 17, 18.
Certainly, there is, in our view, some ground for thinking that many appeals
under s. 41 of the Patent Act are brought regardless of any considered opinion
that there is, under the authorities, any valid ground for attacking the
Commissioner's decision. In this case, we have decided to give the appellant the
benefit of the doubt but we do not wish it to be thought that we will be so
charitable in the future.
Id.
291 David Crane, Drug Bill Concessions Seem Tied to Trade Talks, TORONTO STAR,
Dec. 7, 1986, at BI ("U.S. pressure for change in the Canadian legislation began before
the Canada-U.S. free trade talks, intensifying in the early 1980s with the election of the
Reagan administration.").
292 A Licensing Law that Hurts U.S. Drugmakers, supra note 268, at 34 (noting that
the after-tax profit margin of research pharmaceutical firms fell from 7% in the early
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worried about the impact of compulsory licenses on the future of
the industry as technological breakthroughs loomed in a whole
series of drugs used in the treatment of heart ailments,
hypertension, and ulcers.293 As early as 1982, U.S. Trade
Representative William E. Brock raised the issue of compulsory
licensing with Canadian counterpart Trade Minister Edward
Lumley.29 '
So long as the Canadian economy was strong, there was little
effective political opposition to compulsory licensing.9 However,
when the economy began to experience the effects of the slow-
down in the U.S. economy,296 "the discourse surrounding drug
1970s to 4% in 1981); see also Bernard Simon, Drug Groups Press for Protection, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1985, at 6 (noting that the Canadian market was then the ninth largest
pharmaceutical market in the world, with sales estimated at CND $1.2 billion). Because
of the size of the Canadian market, it was an important one for U.S. drug companies. Id.
293 A Licensing Law that Hurts U.S. Drugmakers, supra note 268, at 34. Donald D.
Davies, President of Ayerst Laboratories, a division of American Home Products Corp.,
was quoted as saying, "[t]he licenses are on the most spectacular drugs that have taken
the biggest investment." Id.; see also An Anti-Depressant for America's Drug Industry,
THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 12, 1985, at 70-71 (noting that the drug companies grumble about
generic equivalents coming on the market in Canada before the patents on their products
have expired).
294 A Licensing Law that Hurts U.S. Drugmakers, supra note 268, at 34; see also
Crane, supra note 291, at BI.
At a Canada-U.S. conference in November, 1983, a top U.S. trade official, William
Merkin of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, included the pharmaceutical
legislation as an example of a "protectionist" Canadian policy. "While the legislation
was intended to address assertions that foreign pharmaceutical companies were making
inordinately high profits," Merkin complained, "its effect has been to allow companies
that have not contributed to the costly and risky research and development process to
invade the market of the innovator, reducing his return and his incentive to invest in new
product research and development." Id.
295 See CAMPBELL & PAL, supra note 6, at 33.
296 Winston Williams, Glory Days End for Pharmaceuticals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24,
1985, § 3, at 1.
After years of profits so fat that they immunized the $30 billion American
pharmaceutical industry against economic downturns, the big drug companies
have suddenly found themselves mired in the same sort of troubles that have
plagued less-glamorous industries for years. Spiraling imports, legislative
changes and new competition at home and abroad have struck hard. And with
new blockbuster products harder and harder to come by, America's supremacy
as the world's premier maker and seller of prescription drugs could be in
jeopardy.
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patent policy changed gradually but inexorably." '297 The Liberal
Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau, a longtime advocate of
compulsory licensing, became concerned about the lack of
research being undertaken in Canada. 98
Trudeau was potentially vulnerable to the protests of the
research pharmaceutical industry because it was concentrated in
Quebec, where half the Liberal caucus was based. 9 When Smith,
Kline and French, Hoffman-La Roche, and American Home
Products subsidiary Ayerst, McKenna and Harrison all closed
Quebec operations, employment suddenly became an important
component of the drug patent debate.3" There were predictions that
"Canada could lose as much as $75 million/year (Canadian) that is
invested in pharmaceutical research and development. 30' Gilbert
Paquette, Quebec's Minister for Science and Technology, in a
letter to Andre Ouellet, Canada's Minister of Consumer and
Corporate Affairs and the person responsible for proposing any
modifications in the patent law, called for the repeal of
compulsory licensing.3"2 Paquette argued in the letter that "since
1969, when Section 41 of the patent act was amended, industry
and pharmaceutical research in Quebec [has] been heavily
penalized. Their survival is in danger.
30 3
297 CAMPBELL & PAL, supra note 6, at 34.
298 Id.
299 Id.
30 See David Oxtoby, Drug Industry Awaits Compulsory Licensing Verdict, FIN.
POST, Mar. 9, 1985, § 3, at 11; see also John Sawatsky & Harvey Cashore, Inside Dope:
The Multi-Million Dollar Sellout of Canada's Generic Drug Industry, 20 THIS
MAGAZINE § 3, at 8 (1986).
301 Canada May Water Down Its Law on Drug Licensing, CHEM. WK., May 18,
1983, at 45.
302 Id.
303 Id.; see also Mediating a Drug-Patent Hassle, CHEM. WK., June 15, 1983, at 15.
Ouellet [offered] three possible courses that [were] designed mainly to make
research and development activity in Canada more attractive to multinational
pharmaceutical producers. One course would retain the compulsory licensing
system now in effect, but would change the standard 4% royalty rate, pegging
the amount to reward R&D investment by the patent holder. A second proposal
is for a "mini-patent" system for pharmaceutical products that would provide
protection between the void in current legislation and the 17 years for other
inventions. The third idea: Eliminate compulsory licenses when companies
agree to certain price levels and R&D investment.
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In response to pressure from both proponents and opponents of
compulsory licensing, Judy Erola, Ouellet's replacement as
Minister of Science and Technology, appointed a Royal
Commission of Inquiry on the Pharmaceutical Industry." The
Commission, which became known as the Eastman Commission
after its chairman, University of Toronto economist Harry
Eastman, released its report in May 1985.30 The report concluded
that the Canadian research pharmaceutical industry was not
adversely affected by compulsory licensing, that Canadian
consumers had saved $211 million in 1983, and that patent policy
in Canada had little or no effect on the research and development
investment decisions of multinationals. 31 "The report suggested
giving new drugs four years of protection and creating a royalty
fund to reward firms doing their R&D in Canada.
307
Between the appointment of the Eastman commission and the
release of its conclusions, Canada held a federal election.
Conservative candidate Brian Mulroney won the election in a
landslide. Just as the outgoing Liberals had, Mulroney's
Conservatives drew a disproportionate number of its
Parliamentarians from Quebec. °8 Unlike the Liberals, Mulroney's
Conservatives had no historical affection for compulsory
licensing.
B. Canada: The Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement and Bill C-22
U.S. President Reagan and Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney
met in March 1985 in Quebec City at what came to be called the
Shamrock Summit."° Canada's compulsory licensing system was
item number three on Reagan's agenda."' At the conclusion of the
Id.
'04 CAMPBELL & PAL, supra note 6, at 37 (calling Erola's commissioning of a study
"a quintessential Canadian move").
305 David Oxtoby, supra note 300.
306 See MCDONALD, supra note 18, at 207.
307 CAMPBELL & PAL, supra note 6, at 38.
308 Sawatsky & Cashore, supra note 300, at 10.
309 Lexchin, supra note 272, at 151.
310 Gord Crann, Patent Act Could Be Mulroney's Undoing, TORONTO STAR, Nov.
30, 1986, at F3 (reporting that President Reagan raised the matter of Canadian drug
patent laws with Mulroney as item number three at the first Shamrock Summit in Quebec
city on Mar. 17, 1985).
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meeting, Reagan and Mulroney issued a communiqu6 directing
U.S. Trade Representative William Brock and Canadian Trade
Minister James Kelleher to resolve some eight "specific
impediments to trade.""' One of the eight specific impediments
identified in the communiqu6 was "abuses of copyright and patent
law., 31 2 "The communiqu6 also talked of developing 'common
standards and understandings regarding patents ... ,,,313
On September 26, 1985, Mulroney announced that he would
propose to "negotiate the broadest possible package of mutually-
beneficial reductions in tariff and nontariff barriers" between
Canada and the U.S.
3 14
The United States was interested in, among other things,
revamping the Canadian compulsory licensing system. 13 In
October 1985, the annual report of the U.S. Trade Representative
complained that Canada's compulsory licensing policy was
costing U.S. companies "hundreds of millions of dollars.""31 The
report stressed that the United States had "repeatedly raised the
issue of patent protection for pharmaceuticals and the compulsory
licensing provisions of Canada's patent law in trade discussions,
usually in connection with compulsory licensing. 31 7
During hearings over fast-track trade negotiation authorization,
the U.S. Trade Representative told a Senate Finance Committee
that intellectual property was among the areas that had been
identified and would be pursued during any trade negotiations.18
311 Crane, supra note 291, at B1.
312 Id. (noting that the patent law dispute had to do with Canada's pharmaceutical
legislation).
313 Id.
314 Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Statement to the House of Commons (Sept. 26,
1985), reprinted in Shelly Battram, Canada-United States Trade Negotiations:
Continental Accord or a Continent Apart?, 22 INT'L LAW. 345 (1988).
315 See Giles Gherson, Free Trade Flashpoints: Lumber, Drugs, Publishing Are
Prickly Issues, FIN. POST, Dec. 21, 1985, at 1 ("Big U.S. drug companies are lobbying
furiously against what they consider inadequate pharmaceutical patent protection in
Canada, and they want relief-fast. The focus of their ire: laws in force since 1969 that
permit generic drug companies to swiftly copy new products developed by the giant
multinationals.").
316 Crane, supra note 291, at B1.
317 Id.
318 Battram, supra note 314, at 366-67.
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The Committee was told that "[t]he American business community
[was] concerned about the protection of intellectual property in
Canada.... [They] felt that Canada does not accord adequate
protection to American ownership of pharmaceuticals.
' 319
President Reagan promised Senators that any free trade
agreement between the U.S. and Canada would provide for
"comparable treatment for America and Canada in investment and
intellectual property rights in both countries.., while involving
outstanding trade disputes.""32
Prime Minister Mulroney seemed to be agreeing with Reagan
when he conceded that the country had acted "as a scavanger in
the area of intellectual property."32' Consumer and Corporate
Affairs Minister Harvie Andre was even more blunt, referring to
the 1969 bill granting compulsory licensing as legalized theft.322
Andre argued that with the repeal of compulsory licensing, Canada
"will no longer be taking a free ride at the expense of the rest of
the world." '323
Negotiations commenced in Ottawa on May 21, 1986, with
Ambassador Peter Murphy from the United States Trade
Representative's office and Ambassador Simon Reisman as the
Canadian negotiator.2 According to McDonald, however, U.S.
Trade Representative Peter Murphy entered the free trade
negotiations with little direction from the Reagan administration.23
Instead, Reagan chose to delegate most of the management
authority to the Advisory Committee on Trade Negotiations
(ACTN).326
319 Id. at 367.
320 Id.; see also Crane, supra note 291, at B 1 (noting that Senator Dole introduced a
resolution stating that "no trade agreement with Canada should be submitted for
review ... until such agreement" could satisfy Congress on the "full and effective
protection for intellectual property rights in Canada comparable to the protection
afforded such rights in the United States").
321 McDONALD, supra note 18, at 211.
322 Alan Story, Drug Wars: Does anyone really know the price tag? Ottawa says its
plan to change law won't raise prices. Others disagree, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 20, 1986,
at B1.
323 Id.
324 McDONALD, supra note 18, at 200-01.
325 Id. at 206.
326 Id.
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The chairman of the ACTN was Edmund Pratt, Chief
Executive Officer of Pfizer Inc., and president of the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association."' According to a
profile in the National Journal, "many Washington observers think
that [Pratt] is the corporate executive with the most influence on
trade issues, influence that he has used to further his company's
goals as well as the nation's. '' 328 "After a talk with Pratt, Peter
Murphy had no doubt about his marching orders on the
pharmaceutical question: his job was to wangle an intellectual
property clause encompassing patent protection in the free trade
negotiations."29
"Then suddenly, without warning in early 1986, [U.S. Trade
Representative Peter Murphy] was told not to bother [pursuing
patent protection for pharmaceuticals in trade negotiations]: the
drug-makers were doing a side deal with the Canadian government
at the highest level.
30
[According to] Bill Merkin, the U.S. deputy chief negotiator in
the free-trade talks, . . . "Ottawa didn't want [intellectual
property] to be in the free trade negotiations. They didn't want
to appear to be negotiating that away as part of the free trade
agreement. Whatever changes they were going to make, they
wanted them to be viewed as... 'in Canada's interest.'
331
On June 27, 1986 Mulroney's government attempted to
introduce Bill C-22. 32 "Bill C-22 propose[d] ... to grant
manufacturers of new drugs ten years of market exclusivity.
33
327 Id.
328 Crane, supra note 291, at B 1.
329 MCDONALD, supra note 18, at 208,
330 Id. at 208-09 ("In Ottawa, federal bureaucrats soon got the same message: the
government immediately moved to bring in a new pharmaceutical bill to undo
Trudeau's.").
331 Lexchin, supra note 272, at 151.
332 Sawatsky & Cashore, supra note 300, at 12 (Michael C6td, Minister of
Consumer and Corporate Affairs, submitted Bill C-22 hours before Parliament's summer
recess. Having been delivered to Parliament Hall by courier, the bill sat on the desk of a
security guard. When House Speaker John Bosley called for bills, "C6td had no bill to
present." Because it was the last day before Parliament's recess, Bill C-22 would not be
introduced until the Fall term.).
333 David Owen, Ottawa's Unusual Drug Patent Bill, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1987, at
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"Generic manufacturers [could] reduce [that] exclusivity period to
seven years if they agree[d] to source the drug's active ingredients
domestically." '334 The Canadian equivalent of the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act compromise, Bill
C-22 sought to keep drug prices under control during the
monopoly period by establishing a Patented Medicines Price
Review Board, which was to be empowered to award compulsory
licensing for "any drug it found to be overpriced." '335 Though not
part of the legislation, the research pharmaceutical industry
promised to invest $1.4 billion in Canada.336
While the trade issues were being negotiated, Bill C-22
languished in Parliament. Mulroney's Conservatives had a
majority in the House but the Senate was dominated by opposition
Liberals. The Liberal-dominated Senate, which like the British
House of Lords is unelected, had traditionally rubber-stamped
legislation approved in the House. 37 This fact, however, may have
had more to do with the Liberals' historic hold on the House than
on any predilection for House measures on the part of the
Senators.3 The resurgent Senate Liberals, for the first time in
Canadian history, refused to sign a bill passed by the House of
Commons on two occasions, forcing the House to pass C-22 three
334 Id.
335 Id.
336 Id.; see also Bernard Simon, Multinationals Offer Deal On Canadian Drug Rule,
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1986, at 6 (citing an announcement by Miles Laboratories,
Beecham Laboratories, and Glaxo Canada of "substantial new investments in Canada on
condition that the Federal Government presses ahead with controversial legislation to
tighten patent protection on brand-name medicines").
337 Senate Finally Passes Patent Act Amendment Ending Compulsory
Pharmaceutical Licensing, 4 INT'L TRADE REp. (BNA) 1492 (Dec. 2, 1987) ("The
Canadian Senate, whose members are appointed, usually does little more than rubber-
stamp government legislation from the elected House of Commons."); David Hatter,
Drug Bill Struggle Poses Question on Senate Role, FIN. POST, Nov. 2, 1987, at 6 ("In
practice, senators have usually acted with restraint due to their nonelected status.").
338 See Senate Finally Passes Patent Act Amendment Ending Compulsory
Pharmaceutical Licensing, supra note 337, at 1492.
The Senate ... has all the same powers as the House of Commons, with three
exceptions. On paper, the only limitations to the Senate's powers are: it cannot
hold a vote of confidence on the government; it cannot originate money bills;
and on a constitutional amendment, it cannot veto what the Commons has
passed, only delay it for 180 days.
Hatter, supra note 337, at 6.
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times.339
Opponents of C-22 continued to focus on allegations that drug
prices would rise and that the entire debate was fueled by the free
trade talk with the U.S. ' Opposition leader John Turner
questioned why the Mulroney government was using "the sick and
the elderly as a pawn in the free trade negotiations."3 ' Turner
characterized as "obscene [the] desire of the government of
Canada to bow to American pressure to amend our drug patent
legislation and dramatically increase prices in order to maintain
the free trade negotiations. 342 In somewhat hyperbolic fashion,
Jack Kay, Chairman of the Canadian Drug Manufacturer's
Association (CDMA), compared Bill C-22 to "economic rape."3 '3
During the free trade negotiations, Canada was confronted
with another issue of national political importance: Quebec.'" In
the early 1980s, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau made
constitutional reform a centerpiece of his administration. 5 The
result of Trudeau's efforts, the Constitutional Act of 1982,
included increased protection for individual and minority rights.3 6
However, those in the Quebec nationalist movement were
displeased that the Act failed to grant any special status to
Quebec.347
Prime Minister Mulroney, whose Conservative Party drew a
339 Kenneth Freed, Canada on Brink of Constitutional Crisis; Proposed Drug Bill
Sparks Critical Parliamentary Confrontation, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1987, at 6.
340 Alan Story, supra note 322, at BI (citing claims that the proposed patent law
changes contained in Bill C-22 could cost Canadian consumers $4 billion in higher
prescription drug prices over the next ten years).
341 CAMPBELL & PAL, supra note 6, at 40.
342 Id. at 43.
343 William Walker, Consumers Will Be Hurt, Panel Told Free Trade and Drug Bill
Called "Economic Rape," TORONTO STAR., Oct. 27, 1987, at A2.
344 See generally Elizabeth L. Wiltanger, Sound the Trumpets! Quebec is Shouting,
"Victory!" Despite the Canadian Supreme Court's Denial of Unilateral Secession, 17
DICK. J. INT'L L. 505 (1999); Kevin Sneesby, National Separation: Canada in Context-
A Legal Perspective, 53 LA. L. REv. 1357 (1993).
341 Wiltanger, supra note 344, at 507.
346 Id.
347 Id. Only the federal government and nine predominantly English-speaking
provinces agreed on the Constitutional Act of 1982, with Quebec obviously not among
them. Id. at 507.
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disproportionate number of seats from the Quebec caucus, was
keen on satisfying Quebec's demands."8 The Meech Lake Accords
of April 1987 were the product of Mulroney's desire to have
Quebec ratify a new Canadian constitution.49 The Meech Lake
Accord integrated five of Quebec's demands. 5° "The first was 'a
constitutional recognition of Quebec's status as a distinct
society.""'35 The second was a constitutional provision giving
Quebec preeminent control over immigration to the province. "2
"The third addressed 'restrictions on federal spending in areas of
provincial jurisdiction."'"" The fourth demand was that Quebec be
given a "veto over constitutional amendments involving changes
to federal institutions, and an extension of Quebec's right to opt
out with compensation from amendments transferring jurisdiction
from the provinces to Ottawa." '354 "The final claim sought
[increased] 'participation in [the] naming [of] some Supreme
Court ... judges."'355
With the support of Prime Minister Mulroney, all of the
provincial premiers, and the leaders of the federal opposition
parties, the Meech Lake Accord appeared likely to be ratified.356
However, when "Manitoba did not assent [and] New Brunswick
withdrew its ratification,... the Meech Lake Accord ... failed.
357
The significance of the Meech Lake Accord and Bill C-22 is
the special role that Quebec played in the caucuses of both the
Conservatives and Liberals. Both parties drew a disproportionate
number of MPs from Quebec. Montreal, Quebec was the center of
the research pharmaceutical industry in Canada. At a time when
secessionist pressures within Quebec were growing and
negotiations were underway to pacify Quebec nationalists at
Meech Lake, opposition to Bill C-22 began to be framed as anti-
141 Sneesby, supra note 344, at 1364.
349 Id. at 1363.
350 Wiltanger, supra note 344, at 508.
31, Id. (quoting R. KENT WEAVER, THE COLLAPSE OF CANADA 57, 60 (1982)).
352 Id. at 508.
313 Id. (quoting WEAVER, supra note 351, at 60).
354 Id. (quoting WEAVER, supra note 351, at 61).
355 Id. (quoting WEAVER, supra note 351,. at 61).
356 Wiltanger, supra note 344, at 509.
"I Sneesby, supra note 344, at 1364.
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Quebec.
Prime Minister Mulroney acted as heresthetician, adding a new
dimension into the debate about compulsory licensing. Mulroney
accused opponents of C-22 of "choking off $700 million of
investment going right into the province of Quebec and 1300 jobs
in science and technology and ... inflicting irreparable damage to
the scientific well-being of Quebec.""' 8 Mulroney was joined by
Quebec Liberal Senator Pierre de Bane and Liberal MP J.C.
Malepart, among others, who "broke ranks with the Liberal party
under pressure from constituents." '' In essence, Bill C-22 became
"the latest symbol.., of the economic tug-of-war between Quebec
and Ontario, Montreal and Toronto.""3 '
As the free trade negotiations with Canada dragged on, "the
White House threatened to throw the whole thing overboard unless
Ottawa rammed through the pharmaceutical bill. '36' The
compulsory licensing issue continued to play a central role in the
negotiations of a broader U.S.-Canada trade deal. "For the Reagan
administration, any backing away.., by Prime Minister Brian
Mulroney from [Bill C-22] ... because of protests by Canadians
would be seen as a clear sign that [his] government, when put to
the test, lacks the political spine to make the concessions the U.S.
expects." '362 No matter how much the Conservatives tried to
distance Bill C-22 from the free trade talks, the connection
between the two was inescapable.363
358 CAMPBELL & PAL, supra note 6, at 43.
359 Id.; see also Bill Fox, Quebec Liberals Tiptoe Around Patent Drug Issue,
TORONTO STAR, Aug. 23, 1987, at B3 ("Quebec is expected to see some $800 million of
the promised new investment and 1,300 of the new jobs. Quebec's Liberal Premier
Robert Bourassa stands foresquare behind the Mulroney government's legislation;
Malepart and company, aware of the bill's popularity in their own electoral backyards,
are tiptoeing around.").
360 Robert McKenzie, Quebecers Like Tory Drug Bill, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 5,
1987, at A30 (noting that "[t]he two biggest generic drug manufacturers in Canada,
Novapharm and Apotex, are in (Metro) Toronto and.., have lobbied ferociously
(against Bill C-22)").
361 McDONALD, supra note 18, at 213.
362 David Crane, If Patent Drug Bill Is Approved a Free Trade Deal May Be Next,
TORONTO STAR, Dec. 13, 1986, at B2 ("Should Mulroney give in to pressures from
ordinary Canadians worried about the effect the legislation will have on drug prices, the
Americans would probably abandon their interest in comprehensive free trade talks.").
363 See House of Commons Rejects Senate Changes, Fails to Amend Pharmaceutical
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Trade Minister Pat Carney protested that "[a]t no time did
negotiators agree to the inclusion of a commitment with respect to
Bill C-22 as part of the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement."36 '
Michael Wilson, Canada's Finance Minister, insisted that Bill
C-22 "was not and is not related to the free trade agreement." '365
Even while part of the Canadian government was denying any
connection, however, Senate Government Leader Lowell Murray
was warning Liberal senators who threatened to block C-22 that to
defeat the drug bill could kill the free trade deal. "If the
[Canadian] Senate were to defeat Bill C-22, I believe that many
congressmen and senators in the United States would think twice
about their support for the free trade agreement. '66
In the end, it appears obvious that Bill C-22 and the Free Trade
Agreement were conjoined in the negotiators' minds. "In their
initial October 4, 1987, summary of the [free trade] deal for
Reagan's cabinet, [Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter's office]
acknowledged an agreement for the 'effective protection of
pharmaceuticals in Canada by liberalizing compulsory licensing
provisions.' 36 "By the time an updated version of the text was
released to the press days later, that admission had disappeared. 68
Patent Act, 4 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1387 (1987) (quoting Jack Kay, chairman of the
Canadian Drug Manufacturers' Association, as telling a "parliamentary committee
studying the free trade agreement with the United States" that "[i]t is unconscionable that
a foreign power, under the guise of negotiating a free trade agreement, could actually
dictate a major change in domestic economic and social policy").
164 Joe O'Donnell, Ottawa Denies Link to Drug Bill, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 10, 1987,
at A4.
365 Owen, supra note 333, at 9.
366 O'Donnell, supra note 364, at A4.
367 McDONALD, supra note 18, at 213; see also Ed Broadbent, U.S. Comes Out a
Clear Winner, FIN. POST, Oct. 19, 1987, at 14 (citing "U.S. government briefing notes on
the trade deal prepared for Treasury Secretary James Baker... [claiming] under the
heading 'What the U.S. got,' that: 'Canada will enact pending amendments in Bill C-22,
and Parliament will review within 10 years the further protection for pharmaceutical
inventions."').
368 MCDONALD, supra note 18, at 213; see Stuart Auerbach, U.S. Bowed to
Canadian Demands to Change Pact, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1987, at G1 (noting that:
Canadian negotiators [had] demanded the removal of a section pledging Canada
to change its drug patent laws [and that] to Reagan administration officials,
headed by Treasury Secretary James A. Baker III and U.S. Trade Representative
Clayton K. Yeutter, bowed to the Canadian demand and allowed the section on
the drug patents to be removed.
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However, the proverbial cat was already out of the bag. In fact,
"both [U.S. Trade Representative Peter] Murphy and [deputy
Canadian trade negotiator Bill] Merkin confirm[ed] the link." '369
Still, the Free Trade Agreement was an enormous achievement.
"U.S. Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter compared 'the
historic significance of the [CFTA], in the economic sphere,. . . to
the historic significance of the U.S.-Soviet arms control treaty in
the national security arena.'
370
C. Canada: The NAFTA and Bill C-91
The battles over Bill C-22 and the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement began a decade-long process of regional and
international integration. During the next ten years, the U.S. and
Canada would add Mexico in a North America Free Trade
Agreement and complete an historic round of negotiations under
the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade. Again, intellectual
property rights would play an important role in both talks. And
again, the United States research pharmaceutical industry would
direct the U.S. effort to increase international intellectual property
standards.37'
This time, Canada's domestic reaction to U.S. pressure was
Bill C-91.7 2 Bill C-91 would further amend Canada's patent law,
making two fundamental changes."' First, Bill C-91 would
eliminate compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals altogether. 74
369 MCDONALD, supra note 18, at 213.
370 Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The NAFTA: Its Overarching Implications,
27 IN'L LAW. 589, 590 (1993).
371 See Linda Diebel, How U.S. Drug Lobby Put New Patent Law atop Canada's
Agenda, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 6, 1992, at Al.
The U.S. pharmaceutical industry, one of the richest and most powerful sectors
in America, has been fighting for [elimination of compulsory licensing] since
Canada brought in consumer-friendly drug legislation in 1969. Finally, in [the
NAFTA negotiations], they won virtually every demand they made of Trade
Minister Michael Wilson in the free trade negotiations.
Id.
372 Silbermann, supra note 20, at 622 (arguing that Canada's maintenance of its
limited compulsory licensing scheme promoted the U.S. to place it on the Special 301
Watch List in 1989, 1990, and 1991).
373 CAMPBELL & PAL, supra note 6, at 50.
374 Id.
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The patent term for pharmaceuticals would be extended to the
international standard twenty years, including ten years of market
exclusivity.375 Second, the Patent Medicines Prices Review Board
(PMPRB) would be given additional powers to monitor and
enforce drug prices. 76 The PMPRB would have the power, equal
to that of the Federal Court, "to order price decreases, take back
super-profits, and impose penalties, [both] fines and
imprisonment.""3
On June 23, 1992, Bill C-91 was introduced in the House of
Commons.7 8 The reaction was immediate and predictable. The
opponents of Bill C-22, galvanized from their previous fight over
patent reform, immediately mobilized. The Canadian Drug
Manufacturers Association commissioned a study by Dr. Stephen
Schondelmeyer, University of Minnesota professor of
pharmaceutical economics. 9 Dr. Schondelmeyer estimated that
Bill C-91 would cost Canadian consumers between $4 and $7
billion over a fifteen- to twenty-year period.38° This figure
compared to only $500 million in increased research and
development spending in Canada. 8'
In stark contrast to the government's handling of Bill C-22, "it
unabashedly linked Bill C-91 with the GATT agreements and the
North American Free Trade Agreement. 38 2  Minister for
International Trade Michael Wilson, who as Finance Minister had
declared that Bill C-22 "was not and is not related to the [Canada-
375 Id.
376 Id.; see also G. Alexander Macklin & Emma A.C. Grell, Recent Amendments
Aid Rightholders, but Create Procedural Uncertainties, IP WORLDWIDE, Jan.-Feb.
(1996) (describing how Bill C-22 created the Patented Medicines Prices Review Board
(PMPRB)). This board was empowered to review the price of any medicine that was the
subject matter of a Canadian patent to determine whether the medicine was being sold at
an excessive price. Id. If the PMPRB so determined, it could order the patentee to reduce
its price, or it could remove the patentee's exclusivity periods for the excessively priced
medicine and/or one other medicine of the patentee protected by a Canadian patent. Id.
... CAMPBELL & PAL, supra note 6, at 50.
378 Id.
379 Bill C-91 to Cost Canada up to $7 Billion by 2010, U.S. Health Care Economist
Predicts, CANADA NEWS WIRE, Dec. 1, 1992.
380 Id.
381 Id.
382 CAMPBELL & PAL, supra note 6, at 52.
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U.S.] free trade agreement," now argued that Bill C-91 was
required if Canada was to meet its intellectual property rights
obligations under the GATT and NAFTA.383
From the U.S. research pharmaceutical industry's perspective,
Bill C-91 was a watershed moment. With two international
negotiations occurring concomitantly, the research industry was
aware that an agreement on intellectual property within NAFTA
that allowed for Canada to continue to provide compulsory
licenses for pharmaceuticals would end any chance of achieving
an acceptable comprehensive international minimum standard with
the GATT.384
However, if the U.S. research industry was afraid that other
countries might follow Canada's lead and grant compulsory
licenses, it was terrified that its own government might do the
same. Canadian MP Jim Karpoff put it bluntly: "[The U.S.
research pharmaceutical industry is] deathly afraid that [Clinton]
would take a second look at drug prices in the United States and
decide that the only possible way to control drug prices would be
to adopt the Canadian system of compulsory license[s] ..'". "It was
in the multinationals' interest to have Bill C-91 passed before
President Clinton began to take compulsory licensing seriously for
the United States. 386
Unlike the negotiations over Bill C-22 and the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement, when the research pharmaceutical industry
383 Rob McKensie, A Hard Pill to Swallow, CAN. Bus., Feb., 1994, at 44.
384 Ross Duncan & Dave Blaker, Trends in the Pharmaceutical Industry in Canada
in the Post 1987 Environment, (Ottawa: Interdepartmental Working Group, Intellectual
Property Research Branch, Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, unpublished
and undated) ("Perhaps the most significant effects of the Canadian patent policies such
as ... compulsory licensing ... is its role as 'model law' and the potential adoption...
by many other countries without a significant domestic innovative pharmaceutical
sector.") (cited in CAMPBELL & PAL, supra note 6, at 53).
385 CAMPBELL & PAL, supra note 6, at 53; see also Intellectual Property
Enforcement Issues to Play Major Role in NAFTA Talks, 8 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
1554 (Oct. 23, 1991) (quoting Morris Rosenberg, assistant deputy minister for corporate
affairs and legislative policy at Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, citing "[a]
recent report by the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging [that] ... points to high
pharmaceutical prices as a major problem for the U.S. health care system, and refers
favorably to the balance Canada's legislation has created between the interests of
pharmaceutical makers and consumers").
386 CAMPBELL & PAL, supra note 6, at 64.
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had a staunch ally in the White House, President Clinton entered
office with a decidedly anti-pharmaceutical industry position. In
speeches the President had characterized the industry's practices
as "unconscionable" and accused it of pursuing "profits at the
expense of our children." '387 Clinton had warned the industry that
"he would 'stop drug price gouging."'388 In what was to be the
Clinton Administration's biggest first term policy objective,
national healthcare, the President, in "a prelude to introducing his
health care reform plan," singled out drug prices as "one example
of why the health care system doesn't work.""38
What was similar to the debate surrounding Bill C-22 was the
influence of Quebec on Canadian politics." ' First, the
Conservatives still held a majority in Parliament while Bill C-91
was being debated. The Conservatives' maintained their strong
ties to the Canadian research pharmaceutical industry, based
primarily in Quebec. Second, the Liberals, led now by Jean
Chrdtien, continued to be divided on the issue of pharmaceutical
patents. Ideologically, compulsory licensing was a Liberal policy,
begun under the Liberal Trudeau government in 1967. However,
the Liberals continued to draw support from Quebec, with its
strong research pharmaceutical presence."' Attacking Bill C-91
was again viewed, as when Bill C-22 was center stage, as being
anti-Quebec, and ultimately, as being anti-business.1 2 Neither
387 Linda Diebel, Clinton Delivers Blistering Attack on Big Drug Firms, TORONTO
STAR, Feb. 13, 1993, at Al.
388 Robert Pear, Clinton Team to Tackle Drug Pricing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1992,
at B 12.
389 Sarah Fritz, Clinton's Jawboning May Win Drug Firm Price Cuts, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 1993, Al.
390 See CAMPBELL & PAL, supra note 6, at 54 (noting that because the issue of
pharmaceuticals was very important for Quebec and less important for all the other
provinces, Ontario never "raised the issues of Bill C-91 's relationship to NAFTA and the
fact that Quebec's job gains were often Ontario's job losses"); see also Shawn
McCarthy, Metro MP Fears for Fate of Generic Drug Review, TORONTO STAR, June 6,
1994, at A 13 (describing Liberal MP Dan McTeague as "worried that political upheaval
in Quebec has derailed the government's plans to revisit patent legislation that is keeping
lower-cost generic pharmaceuticals off the market").
391 See Shawn McCarthy, Liberals at Odds over Drug Patent Bill, TORONTO STAR,
Sept. 17, 1992, at A16 (quoting from a letter circulated by Liberal MP David Berger
(Saint-Henri-Westmount) arguing that opposition to Bill C-91 "would be a serious
mistake").
392 Phillip Authier, Drug Law Plans Creating Instability: Tremblay; Industry
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moniker played well in Canadian politics. As Montreal MP David
Berger told the Quebec caucus, "[i]n order to maintain existing
jobs and obtain additional investment in today's global market we
need to provide patent protection comparable to that which exists
in other industrialized countries.
'393
With the Liberals divided and the Conservatives now in
control of the Senate, passage of Bill C-91 was inevitable.394
Unlike the Bill C-22 debacle in the Senate, the Conservatives were
able to use a series of parliamentary tactics to limit debate and
ensure that C-91 passed quickly and quietly.395 Bill C-91 became
law on February 4, 1993.
What makes the passage of Bill C-91 ironic is that despite all
the government protests to the contrary, Canada was then under no
obligation to amend its patent system.396 The GATT negotiations
were still ongoing, and in fact would last more than two years. The
U.S. Congress had not approved the NAFTA implementing
Minister Furious with Ottawa over Decision to Amend Patent Act, THE GAZETTE
(Montreal), Apr. 28, 1994, at A7 (quoting Industry and Commerce Minister Gerald
Tremblay as criticizing the Canadian government for suggesting that the issue of
compulsory licensing could be reviewed). "Stating that law C-91 could be reopened
creates instability and when you create instability it gives negative results." Id.
393 McCarthy, supra note 391, at A16.
394 CAMPBELL & PAL, supra note 6, at 61. The Canadian Drug Manufacturers
Association (CDMA), which represents the interests of generic producers, filed suit
enjoining the enforcement of Bill C-91. Id. The CDMA "argued that the government
was.., required by § 39.26 of the Patent Act to... review... Bill C-22 in 1996." Id. It
argued, therefore, that Bill C-91 was beyond Parliament's power to amend the Patent Act
before the review. Id.
391 CAMPBELL & PAL, supra note 6, at 59 (describing the Liberal and New
Democratic Parties' efforts to hold hearings on Bill C-91 and the ruling Conservative
government's ultimatum: "agree to limit the committee stage to a certain number of
hours" or "the government would move to return the legislation to the House of
Commons without committee hearings at all").
396 American Pressure Killed Compulsory Licensing not NAFTA, CDMA Asserts,
CANADA NEWSWIRE, June 2, 1993, quoting Professor of International Business Law at
Osgoode Hall Law School, Jean-Gabriel Castel:
I am of the opinion that in view of article 30 of the Dunkel (GATT) document
and article 1709(6) of the NAFTA, Canada was not obliged to eliminate
compulsory pharmaceutical patent licensing .... As was the case with the FTA,
Canada has now passed Bill C-91 which removes compulsory licensing of
pharmaceutical patents in order to accommodate U.S. concerns using the pretext
that the Dunkel Document and the NAFTA required such a course of action.
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legislation, and, as Congressional Democrats raised concern over
jobs and the environment, looked less likely to do so with each
passing day.397  The Canadian government, which had so
vehemently denied the obvious linkage between Bill C-22 and the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, now argued that an as-yet
nonexistent free trade agreement compelled them to pass Bill
C-91. Ultimately, of course, both the GATT and NAFTA would
come into effect. At the time the Canadian Parliament passed Bill
C-91, however, there was no international mandate for it to do so.
VI. Conclusion
The passage of Bill C-22 provides an excellent example of
how the distribution of benefits obtained from an international
agreement among domestic constituents may impact the decision
of national leaders so as to make voluntary Pareto-inferior
international agreements a possibility.
Regardless of the protests to the contrary, both the treaty
negotiators and the Canadian public viewed Bill C-22 as part of
the Canada-U.S. trade talks.398 Just as clearly, the passage of Bill
C-22 made Canadian consumers worse off (at least in the near
term).399 While additional research and development investments
might lead to the discovery of new medicines, such discoveries
were some time off in the future. Similarly, it is unclear what
percentage of future medicines, whether discovered in Canada or
elsewhere, would not have been introduced into the Canadian
market had Bill C-22 not been passed.
391 E.g., J. Jennings Moss, NAFTA's Backers Fear Ruin in Defeat; Gore Sees
Clinton Hobbled if It Dies, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1993, at Al (detailing the debate in
Congress over NAFTA); Meg Vaillancourt, Labor's Call: Defeat, Defeat, Defeat,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 23, 1993, at 43 (describing labor union leaders' opposition to
NAFTA); Richard Wolf, Opposition Building to Free Trade Agreement, USA TODAY,
Sept. 3, 1993, at 8A (describing the Clinton administration's attempt to attain passage of
NAF1A as "an uphill battle").
398 However, it is interesting to note that the strategy of delinkage places the passage
of Bill C-22 clearly outside the theoretical bounds outlined in Michael P. Ryan, The
Function-Specific and Linkage-Bargain Diplomacy of International Intellectual Property
Lawmaking, supra note 103.
399 Toronto economist Harry Eastman, who headed a royal commission that studied
the impact of compulsory licensing on consumer prescription drug prices, found that
Canadian consumers were paying as much as $300 million more each year for their
prescriptions as a result of the passage of Bill C-22. Crane, supra 269, at C9.
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The explanation for the passage of Bill C-22, therefore, lies in
the search for regulation (in this case patents) by an industry that
relies heavily on government-mandated barriers to entry (i.e.,
patents). The willingness of the Canadian government to accede to
the wishes of this industry, even without popular support, can be
explained by the distribution of benefits derived from providing
the research pharmaceutical industry with its preferred policy.
That is to say, because the Liberal Party drew a disproportionate
amount of support from the Montreal area of Quebec, which,
coincidentally, was the center of the Canadian research
pharmaceutical industry, its historical preference for compulsory
licensing was muted by internal party politics. The importance of
Quebec, especially during the secessionist tumult of the 1980s,
made opposition to Bill C-22 politically risky.
The theory presented herein provides a parsimonious
explanation to the passage of Bill C-22 and the Canada-U.S. trade
agreement. The U.S. research pharmaceutical industry, facing
repeated political defeats within the U.S. domestic political
system, sought to transfer policy decision-making to an institution
more favorable to their interests. By utilizing heresthetics, the
industry was able to change the relevant policy space of U.S.
policymakers and focus the debate about intellectual property
rights on "piracy." Once intellectual property rights became an
important trade issue for U.S. policy makers, domestic opposition
to the research pharmaceutical industry's preferred policy was
muted because the locus of policymaking shifted from the floors
of Congress to the U.S. Trade Representative's Office. In essence,
the research pharmaceutical industry was able to change the
institution in which decisions affecting its interests were made
from one in which it was not achieving its goals (i.e., Congress)
into one in which its goals could be obtained (i.e., the U.S.T.R.).
In Canada, the decision about whether to enact legislation
similar to Bill C-22 was impacted by the distributional
consequences of repealing compulsory licensing as outlined
above. Because the Canadian government insisted that Bill C-22
was not a quid pro quo for any U.S. policy reversals negotiated
within the framework of the trade agreement, one cannot
persuasively argue that the Mulroney administration tied or linked
this costly policy (the repeal of compulsory licensing) to any
tangible benefit (such as easier access to the U.S. agricultural
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market). Even though the evidence is clear and convincing that
Bill C-22 was indeed part of the trade talks (or, at least, that
without repeal of compulsory licensing the United States appeared
unwilling to enter into any trade agreement with Canada), the
government's insistence that it was not is puzzling under existing
theory. Such insistence is puzzling because theories of bargaining
usually stress the importance of linking costly policy reversals to
beneficial policy initiatives; otherwise, domestic opposition to the
resultant international agreement will prevent its enactment.
However, the theory presented herein provides a consistent
explanation that does not rely on trade-offs and issue linkage
bargaining. Rather, one can explain Canada's repeal of
compulsory licensing as a function of domestic politics and the
consequences of the distribution of benefits arising from an
international agreement. That is to say, one need only look at who
the winners and losers would be under a proposed international
agreement to understand whether there exists a domestic coalition
capable of securing passage. In this case, because of the unique
influence of the province of Quebec, both in terms of national
unity and party loyalties, the research pharmaceutical industry was
able to form a winning coalition among Canadian
parliamentarians.
The theory presented herein and the example of the passage of
Bill C-22 suggests that industries that seek to change the national
policies of governments through international negotiation should
look at the distribution of benefits to be derived from the
enactment of the desired change rather than at what other
industries could be included in the negotiations to provide issue
linkage. In other words, the distribution of benefits among
domestic constituencies may be more important in determining the
results of international negotiations than the trade-offs that
negotiators are able to obtain. The conclusion, then, is that Pareto-
inferior international agreements are possible when the
distribution of benefits from such an agreement flow to a winning
domestic political coalition.
On the other hand, the passage of Bill C-91 can best be
explained by Subramanian's status quo reciprocity." The U.S.
first used as leverage the provisions of Special 301 and later the
40 See Subramanian, TRIPs and the Paradigm of the GATT, supra note 101, at 520.
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implicit threat that Canada would be left on the outside of a U.S.-
Mexico trade deal. ' In both cases, the status quo as it existed
before negotiations began was removed, by the United States,
from the possibilities of outcomes should negotiations between the
U.S. and Canada fail to end in agreement. In other words, the
conditions as they existed under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement were not going to remain regardless of Canada's
decision regarding Bill C-91.
The theory presented herein and the examples of the passage
of Bill C-91 suggest that industries that seek to change the national
policies of governments through international negotiation are
aided when the host-government has the power to manipulate,
through its market power for instance, the choice set facing its
negotiating partners. In other words, when the status quo ante is
removed from the set of choices available to negotiators, the
resultant agreement need not reside along the Pareto-frontier.
Rather, it is entirely possible to achieve a voluntary Pareto-inferior
international agreement because the relevant choice is not between
the status quo and the agreement, but between the agreement and
some even worse alternative.
CHRISTOPHER SCOTT HARRISON
401 See Bello & Holmer, supra note 370, at 589.
Canada's government officials faced continuing criticism from opponents of the
CFTA, which was blamed for virtually every economic difficulty facing the country. At
least in the United States, Canada's participation in the NAFTA negotiations appeared to
be largely a defensive maneuver to ensure that the NAFTA did not dilute the Canadian
benefits of the CFTA. If Canada had remained on the sidelines and an U.S.-Mexico
bilateral FTA had been consummated, the result would have been only one North
American country with duty-free access to all of North America-the United States.
Canada had no desire to be a mere spoke on a wheel with the United States as the hub.
Canada concluded that it could benefit from better access to the Mexican market, while
preserving its access to the United States, far and away its largest trading partner. Id. at
590-91.
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